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REASONABLE SUSPICION: 
FOILS ENTRAPMENT CLAIM
R. v. Germain, 2012 SKCA 9
Police knew for some time that the 
accused was licensed to grow 
marijuana in his home for his 
personal use in connection with a 
medical condition. They also received 
information from an anonymous source that he was 
selling  marihuana to kids in town and anyone else 
who came to his door. The information disclosed that 
the accused was licensed to grow marihuana for his 
own use, identified him by name and the town in 
which he lived. The police received such information 
on two occasions, but it was uncertain whether it 
originated from the same person. The police 
confirmed with Health Canada that the accused held 
a current licence to grow and use marijuana in his 
home and also ran a criminal record check. They 
discovered that he had a criminal record, including  a 
dated conviction for possessing  a restricted drug. 
Acting  on this information, the police launched an 
undercover investigation by going  to the accused’s 
home to see if he would sell them some marijuana, 
which he did. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted. The judge, however, stayed 
the convictions on the basis of entrapment. In the 
judge’s view, the police did not act on a reasonable 
suspicion in going  to the accused’s home and buying 
marijuana from him.  
The Crown appealed and the lower court’s ruling  was 
overturned. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found 
the trial judge was wrong  in concluding  that the 
police were not acting  on a reasonable suspicion. 
Justice Cameron, delivering  the Appeal Court’s 
opinion, found the information “was sufficient ... to 
furnish the police with reasonable cause to suspect 
the accused was implicated in the criminal activity 
under investigation, namely trafficking  in marijuana.” 
Since the police had a reasonable suspicion, their 
conduct in purchasing  marijuana from the accused 
did not amount to entrapment.
 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the convictions 
recorded at trial were entered, and the matter was 
remitted back to the trial judge for sentencing. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Crime Control
“One need not be referred to 
evidence to acknowledge 
the ubiquitous nature of 
criminal activity in our 
society. If the struggle against crime is to be 
won, the ingenuity of criminals must be 
matched by that of the police; as crimes 
become more sophisticated so too must be 
the methods employed to detect their 
commission.” - Supreme Court of Canada 
Chief Justice Lamer in R. v. Mack, [1988] 2 
S.C.R. 903 at para. 16.
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA, LLM. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 7-9, 2013
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of 
P u b l i c S a f e t y a n d 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2013 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
is Canada’s largest police leadership conference 
and will provide an opportunity for delegates to 
discuss leadership topics presented by world 
renowned speakers.
“Staying Connected in a Changing World”
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal 
Analysis
see page 0
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of it’s 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Alone together: why we expect more from 
technology and less from each other.
Sherry Turkle.
New York, NY: Basic Books, c2011.
HM 851 T86 2011
Beyond learning  by doing: theoretical  currents in 
experiential education.
Jay W. Roberts.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2012.
LB 1027.23 R63 2012
Brain  rules:  12 principles for surviving  and 
thriving at work, home, and school.
John Medina.
Seattle, WA: Pear Press, 2009, c2008.
QP 376 M43 2009
Conflict 101: a manager's guide to resolving 
problems so everyone can get back to work.
Susan H. Shearouse.
New York, NY: American Management Association, 
c2011.
HD 42 S54 2011 
Continuing  education in BC's public post-
secondary institutions.
Bob Cowin.
[New Westminster, BC: B. Cowin, 2010.
Presents a summary of key dates and changes in 
continuing  education in BC from 1900 to 2010, with 
a particular focus on post-secondary institutions. 
Includes a discussion of Langara College on pages 
57-58 ; in PDF pages 67-68.
LA 418 B7 C693 2010
Critical thinking, thoughtful  writing: a rhetoric 
with readings.
John Chaffee, Christine McMahon, Barbara Stout.
Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, c2012.
PE 1408 C395 2012
First Nations 101.
Lynda Gray.
Vancouver, BC: Adaawx Publishing, 2011.
E 78 C2 G724 2011
How to talk so people listen: connecting  in 
today's workplace.
Sonya Hamlin.
New York, NY: Collins, c2006.
HF 5718 H284 2006
The mobile academy: mLearning  for higher 
education.
Clark N. Quinn.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, [2011], c2012.
LB 2395.7 Q56 2011
Seeing  systems:  unlocking  the mysteries of 
organizational life.
Barry Oshry.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 
c2007.
HM 701 O855 2007
Street-level  bureaucracy:  dilemmas of the 
individual in public services.
Michael Lipsky.
New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, c2010.
HV 41 L53 2010
Thinking  through crisis:  improving teamwork and 
leadership in high-risk fields.
Amy L. Fraher.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
HD 49 F734 2011
Unmasking the face: a guide to recognizing 
emotions from facial clues.
Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen.
Cambridge, MA: Malor Books, 2003.
BF 637 C45 E38 2003
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OBVIOUS NEXUS AMONG 
PERSON, DRUG & LOCATION 
JUSTIFIES SEARCH WARRANT
R. v. Soto, 2011 ONCA 828
A confidential informant tipped off a 
police officer about where the 
accused was living  and that he was 
trafficking  in “large” amounts of 
cocaine. The source also said the 
accused had just got out of Millhaven Penitentiary. 
The officer set up surveillance on the accused’s 
apartment building  and saw him come out and enter 
the passenger side of a white Lincoln that drove up. 
When the car drove off, the officer followed and 
checked the licence plates, discovering  that the car 
had been reported stolen. The car pulled up in front 
of a different building  and someone came up to its 
passenger side. Although the officer could not see 
what was exchanged, he believed that he had 
observed a hand-to-hand drug  transaction between 
the accused and an unknown male. Later, a second 
officer, assisting  with surveillance, saw the car stop 
in front of another building  and an unknown male 
go to the passenger side. Although he did not see an 
actual exchange, he saw their hands touch and 
believed he had seen a hand-to-hand drug 
transaction.  The unknown male walked away from 
the Lincoln and it drove off. In neither incident was 
the unknown male pursued or apprehended. 
Police lost site of the vehicle for a short time but it 
was located in a residential area. The occupants ran 
into a nearby construction site and the accused was 
subsequently located and arrested for possessing 
stolen property. The police also found a cellphone in 
the his possession as well as $600 
and a second cellphone he had 
stashed while trying  to evade 
police. While the accused was in 
custody, the police obtained a 
t e l e wa r ra n t t o s e a rch h i s 
apartment for cocaine, but 
instead found a loaded .40 
calibre handgun. The Information 
to Obtain (ITO) the search 
warrant included; (1) the address 
provided by the source was the 
same address on file in CPIC for the accused, (2) the 
accused was on statutory release from prison for 
robbery related offences, and (3) the accused had 16 
convictions including  weapons offences, drug 
possession and trafficking narcotics. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on 
several firearms related charges, the accused sought 
to quash the search warrant and exclude the gun as 
evidence. He argued, in part, that there was no 
nexus between the place to be searched (apartment) 
and the evidence to be found (drugs).  While there 
may well have been reasonable grounds to think that 
he would have drugs on his person, the accused 
suggested there were no reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that drugs would be found in his 
residence.  The trial judge disagreed, finding  the 
information sufficient to support reasonable grounds. 
“[The officer’s] information was that [the accused] 
was dealing  cocaine,” said the judge. “He saw [the 
accused] leave the building, get into the car, and 
then ... he and [the other officer] each observed 
what they believed to have been two hand-to-hand 
drug  transactions. (That is, they each saw one.)  As 
[the accused] had not stopped anywhere else along 
the way before these transactions, it is reasonable to 
believe that he would have had the drugs on his 
person when he left the apartment.” 
This was not a case where the police were relying  on 
only the statements of the informant. The tip was the 
impetus for the investigation. The police officer had 
personally spoken with the source and swore that 
the source had been reliable in the past. As well, the 
officer was able to corroborate some of the source’s 
information, such as where the accused was living 
and that he was recently released from prison. Plus, 
the police believed they saw two hand-
to-hand drug  transactions involving  the 
accused. And he had two cellphones, 
which, in the officer’s experience, are 
often used by drug  dealers (one phone 
for business and the other for normal 
use). “At the end of the day,” said the 
judge, “the point is that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds in the 
circumstances to think that [the accused] 
had drugs on his person when he left [his 
apartment building] and got into the 
“[I]f a person leaves his 
residence, then almost 
immediately engages in 
two drug transactions, it 
follows that there is a 
good chance that there 
are drugs in his 
residence.”  
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Lincoln, and a reasonable inference that, as a dealer, 
he would have a supply in the apartment.” The 
accused was convicted of four firearms offences.  
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing  the trial judge was wrong  to find that 
the ITO for the search warrant established 
reasonable grounds to believe evidence relating  to 
drug  offences would be found at the residence. In 
his view, the tip from the confidential informant was 
neither compelling  nor sufficiently corroborated, 
the search warrant was invalid, s. 8  of the Charter 
was breached and the evidence of the loaded 
firearm should have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
But the Court of Appeal disagreed, holding  the trial 
judge exercised sound reasoning. The trial judge 
spoke to “an obvious nexus among  a person, drug 
and location, namely, if a person leaves his 
residence, then almost immediately engages in two 
drug  transactions, it follows that there is a good 
chance that there are drugs in his residence.” 
Further, the confidential informant’s tip was 
sufficiently compelling  to support the ITO. “The 
informant was a known credible source,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “He spoke directly to the police 
officer affiant, and the police sought and obtained 
other information to confirm many of the factual 
details provided by the informant.” The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note:  facts of case taken from R. v. Soto, 
2010 ONSC 1734.
Note-able Quote
“I believe that all illegal organizations should be 
outlawed.” - Ian Paisley
CDSA SEARCH WARRANT NEED 
NOT NAME PEACE OFFICER
R. v. Pitre, 2011 NBCA 106
 
Police obtained a search warrant 
under s. 11(1) of the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) 
from a Provincial Court judge 
authorizing  unnamed peace officers 
to search the accused’s residence for cocaine, 
marihuana and marihuana growing  equipment. On 
execution of the warrant, police found a 
sophisticated marihuana grow operation in the 
basement along  with other evidence. While the 
warrant was being  executed, the accused arrived 
and was arrested for producing  marihuana and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. 
“The informant was a known credible 
source. He spoke directly to the police 
officer affiant, and the police sought and 
obtained other information to confirm 
many of the factual details provided by 
the informant.”  
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Search Warrant Review
“In order to comply with s. 8 of the 
Charter, prior to conducting a search 
the police must provide ‘reasonable 
and probable grounds, established 
upon oath, to believe that an offence 
has been committed and that there is evidence to be 
found at the place of the search’. The question for a 
reviewing court is ‘not whether the reviewing court 
would itself have issued the warrant, but whether there 
was sufficient credible and reliable evidence’ to permit 
an issuing justice to authorize the warrant. In 
conducting this analysis, the reviewing court must 
exclude erroneous information from the ITO and may 
have reference to material properly received as 
‘amplification’ evidence. The accused bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the ITO is insufficient.” - Supreme 
Court of Canada Justice Charron in R. v. Campbell, 2011 SCC 
32 at para. 14.  
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At his trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused challenged the legality of the search. He 
contended that the warrant was facially invalid 
because it failed to comply with s. 11 since it did 
not identify, by name, the officer or officers 
authorized to execute the search. Furthermore, he 
argued the warrant was sub-facially invalid because 
the information to obtain (ITO), after editing  the 
objectionable parts, did not disclose reasonable 
grounds for the affiant’s subjective belief that the 
things to be searched for were in the place to be 
searched. The trial judge rejected these submissions, 
upheld the validity of the warrant, convicted the 
accused for producing  marihuana and possessing  it 
for the purpose of trafficking. He was sentenced to 
concurrent jail terms of 14 months and subjected to 
a firearms prohibition and DNA sample order.
The accused appealed to the New Brunswick Court 
of Appeal arguing  the trial judge erred. In his view, a 
CDSA search warrant must identify, by name, the 
peace officer(s) authorized to carry out the search. 
Further, he again submitted that the ITO, after 
redaction, did not provide the necessary reasonable 
grounds. The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. 
Chief Justice Drapeau, writing  the Court’s opinion, 
broadly described the requirements for obtaining  a 
search warrant under s. 11(1) of the CDSA as 
follows:
[This] provision requires a demonstration by 
information on oath that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe there is in the place to be 
searched: (1) a controlled substance in respect of 
which the CDSA has been contravened; or (2) a 
thing  that will afford evidence of any such 
contravention. Section 11(1) goes on to state 
that, in those circumstances, the warrant may 
issue “authorizing a peace officer, at any time, to 
search the place for any such controlled 
substance […] or thing and to seize it”.
Must a specific officer be named?
As for whether a specific officer must be named in a 
s. 11 warrant, the Court of Appeal concluded that it 
“need not identify by name the peace officer or 
officers authorized to carry out the search.” Chief 
Justice Drapeau stated:
WHAT POLICE FOUND
R. v. Pitre, 2011 NBCA 106
๏ A three-stage hydroponic marihuana grow 
operation consisting of 23 marihuana plants.
๏ Mylar on all the walls.
๏ Numerous ballasts, fans, high voltage lights, 
venting and strings tethering the plants to the 
ceiling.
๏ An active drip emitter system consisting of 
tubing, which regulates the amount of nutrient 
solution delivered to each individual container, 
and lava rock. Excess liquid was drained from 
the container and returned to the reservoir and 
reused. Drip emitters can be used with a semi-
porous medium such as ceramic beads, lava 
rock, and gravel.
๏ Two bags of marihuana in the freezer of the 
house, two bags of marihuana in the utility 
trailer in the yard, two bags of lava rock, money 
counters, two sets of digital scales, mini bags, 
score sheets, $2,210 in Canadian currency, $62 
in American currency, 28 pesos and $284 in 
Canadian coins.  
๏ Books entitled:
➡  “Crime School: Money Laundering”; 
➡ “The Indoor Gardener – Hydroponic and 
Aeroponic Gardening”; and 
➡ “Police Powers including Search Warrants.” 
๏ Personal documentation including the 
accused’s birth certificate, passport and 
correspondence indicating he was living at the 
residence. 
๏ Keys to the accused’s truck.  
๏ Keys to the residence.
๏ Traces of tetrahydrocannabinol and cannabinol 
on one set of scales and traces of cocaine on 
the other. 
๏ An expert described the operation as 
commercial in scope and valued the marihuana 
seized at $57,500 (at the pound level), $92,000 
(at the ounce level) and $206,080 (at the gram 
level). 
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Section 11 does not prescribe the use of a 
particular form for a search warrant. In my view, 
a duly signed search warrant purporting to issue 
pursuant to s. 11 of the CDSA will generally pass 
facial muster if it: (1) is directed at named or 
unnamed peace officers from the issuing  judge’s 
jurisdiction; (2) identifies “an offence with 
sufficient precision to apprise anyone concerned 
of the nature of the offence”; (3) describes the 
things “to be seized with enough specificity to 
permit the officers executing the warrant to 
identify them and link them to the offence”; and 
(4) pinpoints the place to be searched “with 
sufficient accuracy to enable the reader to know 
[for] what premises it authorizes the search”. 
[reference omitted, para. 15]
 
Reasonable grounds?
The accused, in challenging  the existence of 
reasonable grounds, isolated each strand of 
information in the redacted ITO and submitted that 
none provides a compelling  basis for the reasonable 
grounds required by s. 11(1) of the CDSA. The Court 
of Appeal found this approach to be inappropriate. 
“The law requires the reviewing  court to consider all 
of those strands contextually,” said Chief Justice 
Drapeau, “and to determine whether, having  regard 
to the totality of the circumstances revealed by the 
ITO, the issuing  judge could conclude to the 
existence of the requisite reasonable grounds.” 
The correct standard of review?
 
Although the reviewing  judge of a search warrant is 
not to substitute their view for that of the authorizing 
judge, the accused argued that since the ITO was 
edited (in this case to protect the identity of 
confidential sources) that is exactly what the 
reviewing  judge was to do. In other words, instead 
of determining  whether the search warrant could 
have been issued the reviewing  judge was to 
determine whether the warrant would have issued. 
But Chief Justice Drapeau again disagreed. The 
standard of review for the substantive sufficiency of 
an ITO is the same, whether the ITO has been edited 
or not. In opining  that the “would” and “could” tests 
are not markedly different, at least for practical 
purposes, he explained:
[T]he reviewing court never knows what the 
warrant judge would have done if the atrophied 
ITO had been put to him or her. For there to be a 
meaningful and principled review at trial of the 
sufficiency of the ITO ..., the issue must be 
whether the authorizing  judge, acting judicially, 
could have given his or her imprimatur on the 
basis of what remains of the information on oath 
he or she was provided. To my mind, the “acting 
judicially” component of the test brings into the 
mix an objective standard: could the issuing 
judge, acting  judicially, have issued the warrant 
on the basis of the information provided in the 
atrophied ITO? ...
In my respectful opinion, any judge would have 
issued the contested search warrant if, having 
regard to the information in the downsized 
supporting  ITO and acting judicially, he or she 
BY THE BOOK:
Search Warrant: CDSA
s.11 (1)   A justice who, on ex parte application, is 
satisfied by information on oath that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that
(a)   a controlled substance or precursor in respect of which 
this Act has been contravened,
(b)   any thing  in which a controlled substance or precursor 
referred to in paragraph (a) is contained or concealed,
(c)  offence-related property, or
(d)   any thing  that will afford  evidence in respect  of  an 
offence under this Act
is  in a place may, at any time, issue a warrant authorizing  a 
peace officer, at any time, to search the place for any such 
controlled  substance, precursor, property or thing  and  to 
seize it.
(4)  An endorsement that is made on a warrant...is sufficient 
authority to any peace officer to whom it was originally 
directed  and  to all peace officers within the jurisdiction of 
the justice by whom it is endorsed to execute the warrant 
and  to deal with the things seized  in accordance with the 
law. 
... 
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could have done so. Let me be blunt, absent 
exceptional circumstances, the judge who 
refuses a warrant despite a showing  of the 
requisite reasonable grounds has not acted 
judicially. Happily, in the real world, a judge 
would only very exceptionally deny a search 
warrant where “the material satisfies the 
authorizing legislation” ...
 
[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a 
situation where the differently formulated 
standards might lead to divergent outcomes. 
They certainly do not in the case at hand and, ... 
on any of the standards of review mentioned in 
these reasons, the information summarized 
therein amply supports the sub-facial validity of 
the warrant. [paras. 34-36]
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
POLICE ACTED ON REASONABLE 
SUSPICION: 
ENTRAPMENT NOT PROVEN
R. v. Lalumiere, 2011 ONCA 825
Two threat assessments conducted by 
the police in 2003 and 2006 
concluded that the accused was in 
the worst one percent of domestic 
violent offenders and had a 70% 
likelihood of assaulting  his ex-wife at least once in 
the next five years. In 2007 a confidential informant 
told police that the accused wanted to hire someone 
to kill his ex-wife and her boyfriend. He was in jail 
at the time for uttering  threats and breach of 
probation and had accumulated 23 prior convictions 
for offences involving  his ex-wife and her boyfriend, 
ranging  from breaches of his probation orders and 
recognizances to assault, uttering  threats and 
criminal harassment. About six weeks later, as part 
of an undercover operation, a police officer posed as 
a member of the Hells Angels and met the accused 
in the visitor’s area of the institution in which he was 
incarcerated. The undercover officer said he 
understood that the accused wanted two people to 
disappear. The accused confirmed this but said he 
could not pay until after his release in December. 
The undercover officer gave the accused his 
telephone number and told him to call. When the 
accused did not call during  the next two weeks, the 
undercover officer returned to the institution and 
again raised the subject of having  two people killed. 
The accused agreed to pay the undercover officer 
$5,000 and telephoned him later that evening  to 
provide details about the habits, vehicles and 
locations of the intended victims. After the 
undercover officer cautioned the accused that there 
would be no turning  back, he agreed to proceed. 
This telephone call was recorded by police.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused was convicted by a jury on two counts of 
counselling  to commit murder. He then brought a 
motion seeking  a stay of proceedings on the grounds 
that he was entrapped. The trial judge dismissed the 
motion, finding  that the police acted on a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused planned to 
commit an offence. His history, which included 
criminal convictions, ignoring  court orders, threats 
to kill, and threat assessments suggesting  he was at a 
high risk of assaulting  his ex-wife and her boyfriend, 
provided an “air of reality” to the confidential 
informant’s report that the accused was attempting  to 
hire someone to kill them. Since the police had a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused intended to 
commit an offence, they were permitted in providing 
him with an opportunity to do so. Further, nothing 
the police did induced him into trying  to hire 
someone to kill his former spouse and her boyfriend. 
The accused then challenged the entrapment ruling 
before the Ontario Court of Appeal. But Justice 
Simmons, delivering  the opinion for the Court of 
Appeal, found the trial judge did not err. “The police 
acted on reasonable suspicion and did no more than 
give the [accused] the opportunity to commit the 
crime,” he said. “Given the [accused’s] history of 
criminal conduct directed at the victims and the 
threat assessments conducted by the police, the 
police were justified in giving  credence to the tip 
received from the confidential informant. In my 
view, the undercover officer’s conduct in this case 
stopped short of inducement.” The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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DOCUMENTATION INCLUDES 
ELECTRONICALLY STORED 
INFORMATION
R. v. Vu, 2011 BCCA 536 
After receiving  a report from B.C. 
Hydro that a service check of a 
residence found that only 4,886 watts 
of an actual 30,600 watts of power 
was being  recorded by the electrical 
meter, police sought and obtained a s. 487 of the 
Criminal Code search warrant to investigate theft of 
electricity.  The warrant authorized the police to 
search not only for equipment used to divert 
electricity but also for “[d]ocumentation identifying 
ownership and/or occupancy.” When the police 
executed the warrant they found a large (1,000+ 
plant), commercial marihuana grow-operation in the 
basement and noted the residence was occupied 
only on a transient basis.  An electrical bypass was 
located in the garage next to the electrical panel. 
Inside the house, there was a laptop computer sitting 
on a desk. Beside the desk was a desktop computer, 
which was connected to a security video camera 
recording  the comings and gongs to the residence 
from the front of the house and along  the driveway. 
Police checked the recordings stored in the desktop 
and examined the laptop computer to determine if it 
contained any documents or photographs that might 
assist in determining  who was in control of the 
premises. An MSN Messenger (an on-line chat) and 
Facebook (a social networking service) were active. 
Using  the laptop’s search tools for documents, 
photographs and videos, police located a resumé 
(and took a photo of it), an email address, and a 
telephone number. A cellular telephone located in 
the living  room was also examined. Its number was 
determined and a photograph, believed to be the 
accused, was found in it. Both computers and the 
cellular telephone were seized and removed from 
the residence.  A series of still photographs were 
taken of the surveillance video stored in the desktop 
computer depicting  the comings and goings from the 
residence during  the five days prior to the execution 
of the warrant. Using  the serial number from a 
computer modem seized from the residence, police 
were able to determine who the registered 
subscriber was from the Internet Service Provider. 
Based on their investigation the police believed that 
the accused controlled the residence where the 
grow-operation was found and a warrant was issued 
for his arrest. He was subsequently arrested on the 
warrant when his name was checked during  an 
unrelated matter through a police database. The 
accused was charged with production of marihuana, 
possession for the purpose of trafficking  and theft of 
electricity. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
admissibility of the security photographs, the resumé 
photograph, the cellular telephone photograph and 
the information obtained from the MSN Messenger 
and Facebook pages became an issue. The judge 
held that the ITO did not support reasonable 
grounds to believe that documentation showing 
ownership and/or occupancy of the residence would 
be found inside the premises. The officer did not say 
he believed this to be so nor were there any facts to 
support such a belief. Nor did the judge accept that 
the justice of the peace could have inferred that 
documents evincing  ownership or occupation would 
be found in the residence. The trial judge also ruled 
that the police were not authorized to search the 
computers and cellular telephone, holding  the 
searches to be unreasonable.  “It is no longer 
conceivable that a search warrant for a residence 
could implicitly authorize the search of a computer 
(or a cellular telephone containing  a memory 
capacity akin to a computer) that may be found in 
the premises even where the warrant specifically 
grants an authority to search for documentary 
evidence of occupation or ownership,” she said. In 
her opinion, a warrant must expressly authorize a 
search for documents in electronic form.  Although 
the judge admitted the images from the desktop 
computer, the evidence obtained from the laptop 
and the cellular telephone was excluded. The judge 
was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused had knowledge and control of the grow-
operation. All charges were subsequently dismissed. 
The trial judge’s ruling  was challenged before the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal. The Crown argued 
that there was a basis on which the authorizing 
justice could have included documentary evidence 
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in the list of things to be searched for and that the 
warrant did authorize the police to search computers 
and cell phones for documents showing  ownership 
or occupancy.
Search Warrant Purpose?
The Court of Appeal first addressed 
the purpose of a search warrant. As 
Justice Frankel noted, “search 
warrants can be used not only to 
obtain ‘evidence’ of criminal activity 
that can be placed before a court, but 
also to gather information to assist in 
the investigation of such activity.” He 
cited previous jurisprudence that 
emphasized the thing  sought in the 
warrant need not itself be evidence 
of the crime, but could be something  that when 
taken by itself or in relation to other things, be 
evidence of the commission of the crime. 
Documentation?
The warrant did authorize the police to search for 
documentation that could assist in determining  who 
was in control of the premises. Even though the 
affiant police officer did not expressly state his belief 
that “[d]ocumentation identifying  ownership and/or 
occupancy” would be found in the residence, the 
absence of an express statement by the informant as 
to that belief is not fatal if the grounds in the ITO are 
capable of satisfying  a justice of the peace as to the 
existence of a particular reasonable belief. “The 
reasonable-grounds standard is well known,” said 
Justice Frankel. “Determining  whether that standard 
has been met involves ‘a practical, non-technical, 
and common-sense assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances’. Further, and of significance here, it 
has long  been accepted that a justice of the peace is 
entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the 
grounds set out in an ITO.” He continued:  
... I agree with the Crown that it was open to the 
justice of the peace to draw the inference that 
there would likely be documentation inside the 
residence that would assist the police in 
determining  who was in control of the 84th 
Avenue premises. I do not accept [the accused’s] 
submission that such an inference would 
amount to a “quantum leap of logic”.
What the ITO disclosed is that the place 
to be searched was a residence (i.e., a 
place in which it is usual for persons to 
live either permanently or temporarily) 
and that municipal records indicated that 
the property was registered to a person of 
that address.  In addition, another person 
had subscribed for electrical service to 
that property approximately one month 
before. Lastly, there was information that 
a substantial portion of the electricity 
being used inside the residence was 
being stolen, which strongly suggested 
that someone was carrying  on activity 
there.
The totality of the circumstances was 
such that it was open to the justice of the peace 
to reasonably infer that it was likely that 
documents that would assist the police in 
determining  who was in control of the 84th 
Avenue premises would be found there. A 
residence, even one used for criminal activity, is 
a place in which such documentation can be 
expected to be found.  Although ... persons 
involved in theft of electricity at a residence 
have an incentive not to leave any identifying 
documents in the premises, experience shows 
they often act otherwise. [references omitted, 
paras. 41-43]
Moreover, the police were not required, as the 
accused suggested, to take other investigative steps 
before seeking  the warrant, such as conducting 
surveillance to determine if there were any persons 
regularly coming  and going  from the residence or to 
see if mail was being  delivered there. “A warrant is 
to be judged on the basis of the grounds that are set 
out in an ITO,” said Justice Frankel, “not on the basis 
of what steps the police could have taken to acquire 
additional grounds.”
Finally, the phrase “[d]ocumentation identifying 
ow n e r s h i p a n d / o r o c c u p a n cy ” wa s n o t 
impermissibly vague. “Although that phrase does 
encompass a broad range of material it does not, 
having  regard to the context, run afoul of the rule 
that requires some degree of specificity in the 
“[S]earch warrants 
can be used not only 
to obtain ‘evidence’ 
of criminal activity 
that can be placed 
before a court, but 
also to gather 
information to assist 
in the investigation 
of such activity.”  
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description of the things for which those executing  a 
warrant are entitled to search,” said Justice Frankel:
Describing  the things to be searched for with 
some specificity serves to control the manner in 
which a warrant is executed.  It places spatial 
limits on where those executing  the warrant may 
search, as they are only entitled to search where 
the things listed on the warrant might reasonably 
be expected to be found.  American courts 
sometimes refer to this as the elephant in the 
matchbox doctrine, i.e., a warrant to search for 
an elephant does not authorize the police to 
look inside a matchbox. Such descriptions also 
serve to limit what the police can seize under 
the authority of the warrant.  In addition to 
guiding the police, they serve the important 
function of allowing those affected by the 
execution of a warrant to ascertain whether the 
police have kept within its limits.
...
In an investigation such as was being  conducted 
in the case at bar it is neither practicable nor 
possible to require either the police or the justice 
of the peace to describe with exactitude the 
“documentation” that could assist in determining 
who is in control of a residence.  Such a list 
would be endless ... [paras. 47, 51]
Noting  other trial decisions, the Court found the type 
of documents that could assist in establishing  control 
over a premises could include medication receipts, 
envelopes, utility bills, a state of title certificate, 
mortgage statements, a home insurance document, 
tax returns, a cheque book, a credit card, a debit 
card, an expired driver’s licence, a bank statement, a 
Christmas card, passport or  a book inscribed “This 
book is the property of” followed by a name. In this 
case, the description of the “documentation” to be 
searched for was as specific as it needed to be.
Electronically-Stored Information?
The authority to search for “documentation” extends 
to electronically-stored information and, therefore, 
the warrant authorized the examination of the 
computers and the cellular telephone. The word 
“document” is to be interpreted having  regard to 
existing  technology. “Today we live in an age in 
which computers, smartphones, and other devices 
capable of storing  information in electronic form are 
ubiquitous,” said Justice Frankel. “We also live in an 
age when it is generally understood that those 
devices are capable of storing documents”:
I am, accordingly, of the view that the warrant 
on its face authorized the examination of 
electronic devices found within the ... residence 
for electronically-stored information that could 
assist the police in determining who was in 
control of that premises. An electronically-stored 
version of, for example, a resumé or photograph, 
is as much a document as a paper (i.e., hard 
copy) version of the same item. [para. 58]
Further, the warrant need not specifically authorize 
the search of a computer or similar device, such as a 
cellular telephone. In other words, there was no 
requirement that a computer or similar device be 
expressly stated on the face of a warrant. Rather, a 
search warrant can implicitly authorize the search.  
[The accused] submits that “courts have long 
recognized that computers may contain 
extensive private information relating to an 
individual, containing documents, videos, and 
photographs of a highly personal nature”.  While 
this is so, it does not follow that a warrant must 
specifically authorize the examination of devices 
that may contain an electronically-stored version 
of a thing listed on the face of a warrant. A 
warrant authorizing a search of a specific 
location for specific things confers on those 
executing  that warrant the authority to conduct a 
reasonable examination of anything  at that 
location within which the specified things might 
be found. Just as it cannot be said that a warrant 
to search for documentary evidence relating to a 
fraudulent scheme would not apply to a four-
drawer filing  cabinet, the existence of which the 
police learn of after entering  a residence, neither 
can it be said that such a warrant would not 
apply to a computer, the existence of which the 
police learn of after entering a residence.  Both 
are likely repositories of the things for which 
authorization to search has been given.
[The accused’s] argument that a warrant must 
specifically authorize the search of a computer 
rests principally on the fact that computers 
generally contain large and varied amounts of 
personal, confidential, and sometimes sensitive 
in format ion, such as cor respondence, 
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photographs, financial records, and medical 
information. However, I do not accept that the 
law governing  search warrants needs special 
rules to deal with computers and similar devices.
It is important to keep in mind that the principles 
of search and seizure already place limits on 
how a warrant can be executed.   As mentioned 
above, those executing  a warrant are entitled to 
search only those areas in which the things listed 
on the warrant might reasonably be expected to 
be found. With respect to electronic devices, this 
means that a device must reasonably be 
expected to contain at least one of the things 
listed on the warrant before it can be examined 
at all.  Further, the scope of the examination of a 
device will be limited to searching for those 
things listed on the warrant.  Put otherwise, the 
fact that the police have authority to search a 
device for one thing  does not mean they have 
authority to search it for other things.  Nor ... 
does it mean that the police will have the 
authority to “scour the entire contents of [a] hard 
drive”. 
...
... When the police, in the course of executing a 
warrant, locate a device that can reasonably be 
expected to contain an electronically-stored 
version of a thing they have been authorized to 
search for, they can examine that device for the 
purpose of determining whether it contains that 
thing  (i.e., information), but only to the extent 
necessary to make that determination. [paras. 
63-65, 68]
Reasonable searches?
The Court of Appeal concluded all of the computer 
and cell phone searches were reasonable. Despite 
the testimony of several officers that their standard 
practice was to examine non-password protected 
computers and cellular telephones for evidence of 
ownership or occupancy when executing  a search 
warrant, what matters is what they did in this case. 
“Even assuming  that computers and cellular 
telephones were improperly searched on other 
occasions, that has no bearing  on the lawfulness of 
what was done in the case at bar,” said the Court.  
laptop computer: the computer was searched for files 
containing  photographs and documents that could 
contain information as to who was using  that computer 
and assist in determining who was in control of the 
premises. This was authorized by the warrant. The MSN 
Messenger and Facebook pages, which were running, 
also fell within the type of “documentation” covered by 
the warrant, even if the officer had to open the pages 
by clicking on their respective ions. “Both programs 
were running, whether an icon had to be clicked to 
make an active page visible is of no significance,” said 
Justice Frankel. However, he would not decide whether 
the officer “could have looked for further information 
accessible through the active pages, e.g., by accessing 
portions of the Facebook page that were not already 
loaded on the computer.”  
cellular telephone: the cellphone was examined to 
determine its number and to see what photographs it 
contained.  These items fell within the types of 
“documentation” covered by the warrant.   And there is 
no suggestion the telephone was examined for any 
other purpose or other types of electronically-stored 
information.
desktop computer:  Although the trial judge admitted 
the photographs of persons coming from and going  to 
the residence found on the security-system computer 
photographs under s. 24(2), the examination of this 
computer would have been reasonable, “as the video 
recordings were examined solely for the purpose of 
determining  whether they could provide information as 
to who was in control of the premises.”
The warrant authorized the police to search for 
documentation that could assist in determining  who 
was in control of the premises, including 
documentation contained in the computers and 
cellular telephone. The evidence obtained from the 
examination of those devices should have been 
admitted.  The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the 
accused’s acquittals were set aside and a new trial 
was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“A warrant authorizing a search of a specific location for specific things confers on those 
executing that warrant the authority to conduct a reasonable examination of anything at 
that location within which the specified things might be found.”  
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ENTRAPMENT: 
INVESTIGATION v. OPPORTUNITY
R. v. Olazo & Storteboom, 2012 BCCA 59
After stopping  a motorist for a traffic 
infraction, a police officer agreed not 
to issue a ticket in exchange for 
information about a local dial-a-dope 
business.  The motorist provided a 
phone number. He said it was an active drug  line in 
the area, operated on a 24 hour/7 day basis and gave 
the names of “Dave” and “Chris” who worked the 
line on different shifts, one of whom was either 
Chinese or Hispanic. The motorist said they used a 
Chevy Cavalier and a gold Ford Explorer. The 
following  day the police officer asked a female 
colleague to call the number and see if a drug 
purchase could be arranged. At about 2:00 a.m., a 
telephone call was made and the two agreed to meet 
at a Home Depot for the purchase of two 
“40s” (rocks of crack cocaine) for $70. Police went 
to the meeting  place, but no one appeared. The 
officer again called the number and the male 
explained that he saw police cars in the area and 
would not stop.  They then agreed to meet in a 
different place but no one showed up there either. 
Later, another officer made several calls to the 
number, a meeting  was arranged in a parking  lot and 
cocaine was sold to an undercover officer. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accuseds pled guilty to trafficking  cocaine, 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  and 
possessing  heroin for the purpose of trafficking, but 
raised the defence of entrapment. The judge found 
that the motorist was not known to the officer, so his 
reliability as an informant was uncertain. The officer 
made no inquiries as to how the motorist knew 
about the information he was providing, so the 
reliability of the information was also uncertain. The 
driver was obviously motivated by a personal benefit 
to provide the information and none of the details of 
the motorist’s information were ever confirmed, 
corroborated or investigated to check out its 
reliability prior to the solicitation for drugs.  The trial 
judge found that by making  direct telephone contact 
without first verifying  any of the information 
provided to the informant, the police operated on 
mere suspicion rather than the reasonable suspicion 
standard required to justify providing  an opportunity 
to commit an offence.  The entrapment defence 
succeeded and stays of conviction were entered. 
 
The Crown appealed, among  other grounds, that the 
trial judge failed to appreciate the nature and effect 
of the first telephone call.  Rather than an 
opportunity to commit an offence, the Crown argued 
that the call was a step in the investigation leading  to 
reasonable suspicion. 
Entrapment
There are two ways in which the defence of 
entrapment becomes available:
1. the authorities provide a person with an 
opportunity to commit an offence without 
acting  on a reasonable suspicion that this 
person is already engaged in criminal activity or 
pursuant to a bona fide inquiry; or
2. although having  such a reasonable suspicion or 
acting  in the course of a bona fide inquiry, they 
go beyond providing  an opportunity and induce 
the commission of an offence.
In this case, the key issue was whether the police 
had a reasonable suspicion before providing  the 
accused with an opportunity to commit an offence. 
Justice Donald, writing  the opinion of the Court of 
Appeal, said this about reasonable suspicion:
Reasonable suspicion has been defined by what 
it is not – something more than mere suspicion 
and less than reasonable and probable grounds – 
and it has been likened to “articulable cause”. ...
From what I have gleaned from the cases, a tip 
from an informant of unknown reliability will 
create a reasonable suspicion when some 
“objective” or “extrinsic” piece of information in 
the tip is confirmed.
Confirmation of the tip must precede the offer.  
Were it otherwise, determining reasonable 
suspicion would be a bootstrapping  exercise and 
ex post facto reasoning would allow the 
opportunity made on mere suspicion, if taken 
up, to raise the level to the requisite standard. 
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Entrapment law distinguishes investigation from 
opportunity.  Steps taken to investigate the 
reliability of a tip, falling short of providing  an 
opportunity to commit an offence, will not give 
rise to the defence. [references omitted, paras. 
16-19]
In determining  whether police activity was merely 
investigation or the presentation of an opportunity to 
commit a crime (which requires a reasonable 
suspicion), a narrower interpretation of opportunity 
than just making  a phone call and pretending  to be a 
buyer was endorsed. “Police can achieve a level of 
reasonable suspicion by engaging  in the 
preliminaries of a drug  transaction without risking 
entrapment,” Justice Donald said.  In this case, the 
officer’s “initial questions designed to set up a deal, 
if the recipient of the call were willing, could be 
seen as investigative steps rather than opportunity. 
The two of them fairly quickly came to terms and 
arranged a meeting.  But by that time, the tip had 
been confirmed in two important ways:  someone 
answered at 2:00 a.m. (a 24-hour line), and the male 
responded positively to the opening  query expressed 
in terms familiar to drug  traffickers and otherwise 
obscure to ordinary persons (it was a dial-a-dope 
line).” At this stage of police activity, the officer 
acquired a reasonable suspicion that she was 
speaking  to a person engaged in trafficking  and she 
could go on to provide the opportunity for a 
transaction.
The Court of Appeal rejected the accuseds’ assertion 
that the police set out to make a drug  deal and that 
their motive in making  the call was not to investigate 
the reliability of the tip but to conclude a 
transaction. Justice Donald found the motive of the 
police in placing  the call was irrelevant.  “The 
authorities make it clear that reasonable suspicion is 
an objective standard,” he said. “For the purposes of 
entrapment, the pertinent question is whether, 
objectively speaking, the police had a reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect was engaged in the drug 
trade when they presented an opportunity to traffic.” 
Although the tip itself may not have been enough to 
“arouse reasonable suspicion, the tip was sufficiently 
detailed and specific to justify placing  a call as the 
next step in the investigation.” This was not a case 
where the police were conducting  a random 
investigation by making  cold calls to phone numbers 
with virtually nothing to go on.  
The trial judge erred in excluding  the first call placed 
by police in deciding  whether an opportunity based 
on reasonable suspicion was provided.  The call 
confirmed the tip and then the police acted on 
reasonable suspicion. There was no entrapment. The 
Crown’s appeal was allowed, the entrapment ruling 
was set aside, and the accuseds convictions were 
restored. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“Entrapment law distinguishes investigation from opportunity. Steps taken to investigate the 
reliability of a tip, falling short of providing an opportunity to commit an offence, will not give 
rise to the defence.”  
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Criminal Harassment
“T he requirements of criminal 
harassment are in section 264 of the 
Criminal Code. .... The prohibited act or 
acts which must be proven are in 
subsection 264(2) and include repeated following, 
repeated communication, watching and besetting or 
threatening conduct. The mental element which must 
be proven is that the appellant knew that the prohibited 
acts complained of would harass (trouble, torment, 
worry, plague, bedevil or badger) the complainants or 
that the appellant was reckless to the fact that his acts 
might cause the complainants harassment. The Crown 
must also prove that the complainants feared for their 
safety and that such fear was reasonable in all of the 
circumstances.” - Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Katzenback, 2011 ABCA 318 at paras. 14-17.  
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ON-DUTY DEATHS DROP
On-duty peace officer deaths in 
Canada dropped by four last year. In 
2011 three peace officers lost their 
lives on the job as reported by the 
Officer Down Memorial Page. 
Once again motor vehicles, not guns, posed the 
greatest risk to officers and continue to do so as the 
last 10 years suggest. Since 2002, 30 officers have 
lost their lives in circumstances involving  vehicles, 
including  automobile and motorcycle accidents (21), 
vehicular assault (5), and being  struck by a vehicle 
(4). These deaths account for 48% of all on-duty 
deaths, which is more than twice the next leading 
cause of gunfire (14) in the same 10 year period. On 
average, six officers lost their lives each year during 
the last decade, while 2002 had the most deaths at 
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2011 Average Tour: 9 years
2011 Average Age: 34
2011 Deaths by Gender: 3 male
2011 Deaths by Cause:
✴ vehicular assault - 2
✴ struck by vehicle - 1
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2010 Deaths by Province:
✴ Ontario - 2
✴ Quebec - 1
Last 10 years by Gender: 
✴ female - 7
✴ male - 55
“They Are Our Heroes. We Shall Not Forget Them.”
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Source: http://canada.odmp.org [accessed February 19, 2010]
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Canadian Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths (by cause & year)
Cause 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 Total
Aircraft accident 2 2 4
Assault 1 1
Auto accident 3 3 1 1 2 1 3 6 20
Drowned 1 1 2
Duty related illness 1 1
Gunfire 1 3 3 5 1 1 14
Heart attack 1 1 2 1 5
Motorcycle accident 1 1
Natural disaster 2 1 3
Stabbed 1 1 2
Struck by vehicle 1 3 4
Vehicular assault 2 1 1 1 5
Total 3 7 4 2 4 6 11 7 6 12 62
Female 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 7
Male 3 6 3 2 4 5 10 6 6 10 55
POLICE ASSAULTS
According  to a Statistics Canada “Police-reported 
crime statistics in Canada, 2010,” assaulting  a 
police officer rose (+45%) from 2009 to 2010. In 
2010 there were 17,377 assault police officer 
offences compared to 11,837 the previous year. This 
increase may be attributable to new offences of 
assault with weapon/CBH to a peace officer and 
aggravated assault against peace officer which were 
recently added to the Criminal Code. These offences 
would have previously been reported under the 
general assault with weapon/CBH or aggravated 
assault provisions. For other assaults in 2010, there 
were 173,843 reports of common assault (level 1), 
51,340 assaults with a weapon or bodily harm 
(level 2) and 3,410 offences of aggravated assault 
(level 3). 
11%
89%
On-Duty Deaths 2002-2011 by Gender
Male
Female
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2009”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 21, 2011.
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U.S. Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths
Cause 2011 2010
911 relatd illness - 2
Accidental - 1
Aircraft accident 1 2
Animal related 1 -
Assault 5 5
Automobile accident 35 42
Boating accident - 1
Drowned 4 1
Duty related illness 7 -
Explosion 1 -
Fall - 2
Gunfire 66 59
Gunfire (accidental) 4 2
Heart attack 10 13
Heat exhaustion 1 1
Motorcycle accident 4 5
Stabbed 2 -
Struck by vehicle 4 7
Training accident 1 1
Vehicle pursuit 4 4
Vehicular assault 12 13
Weather/natural disaster 1 -
Total 163 161
U.S. On-Duty Deaths by Year (2002-2011)
Year 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 Total
Deaths 163 161 138 151 200 160 165 165 149 159 1,681
Avg. age 40 41 40 40 40 38 39 40 38 39
Avg. tour 12 yrs.
8 mos.
11 yrs.
7 mos.
11 yrs,
11 mos
11 yrs,
10 mos
11 yrs,
3 mos
11 yrs, 
5 mos
11 yrs, 
1 mos
12 yrs,
10 mos
10 yrs,
4 mos
10 yrs,
10 mos
Female 11 6 3 12 9 9 5 9 6 15 85
Male 152 155 135 139 191 151 160 156 143 144 1526
U.S. ON-DUTY DEATHS INCREASE
During  2011 the U.S. lost 163 
peace officers, up 2 from 2010. 
The top cause of death was 
gun f i r e ( 59 ) f o l l owed by 
automobile accidents (44), 
vehicular assault (13) and heart 
attack (13). 
The state of Texas lost the most 
officers for the fifth consecutive year at 13 - equal to Florida and 
the U.S. Government - followed by California (10), Georgia (10) 
North Carolina (7), Missouri (6), 
Ohio (6), Tennessee (6), Michigan 
(5), New Jersey (5), and Virginia 
(5).  The average age of deceased 
officers was 40 years while the 
average tour of duty was 12 years 
and 8 months service. Men 
accounted for almost 93% of 
officer deaths while women 
made up 7 %. 
Females
7%
Males
93%
Source: http://www.odmp.org/year.php [accessed January 19, 2011]
“It Is Not How These Officers Died That 
Made Them Heroes. 
It Is How They Lived.”
Inscription at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial,
Washington, D.C.
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YK
122
BC
8,966
NU
130
NWT
197
AB
6,696
SK
2,306
MN
2,593
ON
26,387
QC
15,802
NL
935
PEI
244
NS
1,914
NB
1,377In 2009 the total expenditure on policing was
$12,645,616,000
RCMP ‘HQ’ & 
Training Academy
1,769
CANADA: By the Numbers Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
 398
Quebec Provincial Police
 5,560
Ontario Provincial Police
 6,098
Canada’s Largest Municipal Police Services 2010
Service Officers % Female
Actual Authorized
Toronto, ON 5,776 5,587 18%
Montreal, QC 4,533 4,585 30%
Peel Reg., ON 1,908 1,922 16%
Calgary,  AB 1,883 1,938 15%
Edmonton,  AB 1,607 1,588 19%
York Reg., ON 1,466 1,461 17%
Winnipeg, MN 1,393 1,393 14%
Vancouver, BC 1,376 1,327 22%
Ottawa, ON 1,273 1,362 23%
Durham Reg., ON 920 871 19%
POLICING ACROSS CANADA: 
FACTS & FIGURES
According  to a report recently 
released by Statistics Canada, 
there were 69,438 active police 
officers across Canada in 2011 - 
a slight increase of 188 over 
2010. This was the eighth 
consecutive year of growth. Ontario had the most 
police officers at 26,387, while the Yukon had the least 
at 122. With a national population of 34,482,779, 
Canada’s average cop per pop rate was 201 police 
officers per 100,000 residents. This rate was the same 
as Japan, but lower than the United States (242), 
England and Wales (252), Australia (262) and Scotland 
(331). 
Total population: 34,482,779
Source: Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 
2011, Catalogue no:  85-225-X, December 2011
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CMA Police Officers & Crime Severity Index
CMA Officers-2011 Crime Severity 
Index-2010
Toronto, ON 10,213 57.8
Montreal, QC 7,021 83.7
Vancouver, BC 3,955 101.2
Calgary, AB 1,988 76.5
Edmonton, AB 1,930 102.0
Winnipeg, MN 1,460 122.3
Ottawa, ON 1,346 60.1
Hamilton, ON 1,110 70.9
Quebec, QC 961 56.1
London, ON 765 82.4
St. Catherines-Niagara, ON 761 69.8
Kitchener-Cambridge-Waterloo, ON 757 68.0
Halifax, NS 689 96.8
Windsor, ON 597 66.1
Victoria, BC 556 83.7
Saskatoon, SK 496 128.1
Regina, SK 425 131.4
Gatineau, QC 413 69.3
St. John’s, NL 336 101.9
Barrie, ON 307 60.1
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 280 99.8
Greater Sudbury, ON 260 84.2
Sherbrooke, QC 248 70.7
Kingston, ON 236 62.3
Brantford, ON 235 99.1
Thunder Bay, ON 232 111.3
Saint John, NB 206 91.9
Kelowna, BC 201 113.1
Peterborough, ON 198 67.8
Trois-Rivieres, QC 190 69.4
Guelph, ON 190 50.4
Saguenay, QC 179 73.4
Moncton, NB 156 71.8
GENDER
There were 13,605 female officers in 2011 
accounting  for 19.6% of all officers, or roughly 1 
in 5. This is up from 17.3% in 2005, 13.7% in 
2000, 9.8% in 1995, 6.4% in 
1990, 3.6% in 1985, and 2.2% in 
1980. Quebec had the highest 
percentage of women (23.7%) 
while the Yukon had the least 
(12.3%). The RCMP HQ and 
Training  Academy were 21.1% 
female. 
The number of women in all 
ranks continued to rise. Senior 
officers were 9.5% female, more 
than doubling  over the last ten 
years. Non-commissioned officers 
were 15.8% female, also more 
than twice the percentage from a 
decade ago. Constables were 
21.6% female. This is a slight 
increase over last year. 
Overall, the representation of 
women in policing  continues to 
increase. In 2011 the number of 
women increased (+285) while 
the number of male officers 
decreased (-97). 
Area % 
Female
QC 23.7%
BC 21.2%
NL 18.6%
ON 18.4%
SK 17.7%
AB 17.3%
NS 15.9%
PEI 15.6%
NB 15.3%
MN 14.8%
NU 13.8%
NWT 13.2%
YK 12.3%
OTHER FA$T FACT$
• Police expenditures rose for the 16th 
consecutive year, more than doubling  since 
1994;
• Costs for policing  translates to $371 per 
Canadian;
• Among  provinces, Ontario spent the most on 
policing  ($4,206,322,000) followed by Quebec 
( $ 2 , 2 3 1 , 9 7 4 , 0 0 0 ) , B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 
($1,336,248,000), Alberta ($1,134,759,000) and 
Mani toba ($378,078,000) . The Yukon 
($26 ,124 ,000 ) , P r ince Edward I s l and 
($30,480,000), Nunavut ($40,423,000) and the 
Northwest Territories ($48,154,000) spent the 
least
Based on total expenditures on policing in 2010.
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Canada’s Largest Municipal RCMP Detachments 2011
Service Officers % Female
Actual Authorized
Surrey, BC 596 621 18.2%
Burnaby, BC 302 274 26.8%
Richmond, BC 229 229 22.2%
Codiac Region, NB 152 144 18.4%
Wood Buffalo, AB 150 147 24.0%
Kelowna,  BC 149 155 23.4%
Nanaimo, BC 146 134 21.2%
Coquitlam,  BC 138 140 23.9%
Red Deer,  AB 137 151 29.9%
Prince George, BC 134 127 22.3%
Langley Township, BC 127 130 29.1%
Kamloops, BC 122 122 24.5%
Chilliwack, BC 102 102 25.4%
RCMP
The RCMP had the largest presence in 
British Columbia with 6,116 officers, 
followed by Alberta (2,817), Ontario 
(1,479) and Saskatchewan (1,278).
RCMP On-Strength Establishment         
as of September 1, 2011
Rank # of positions
Commissioner 1
Deputy Commissioners 9
Assistant Commissioners 25
Chief Superintendents 51
Superintendents 186
Inspectors 440
Corps Sergeant Major 1
Sergeants Major 3
Staff Sergeants Major 16
Staff Sergeants 942
Sergeants 2,140
Corporals 3,672
Constables 11,717
Special Constables 78
Civilian Members 3,760
Public Servants 6,194
Total 29,235
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
According to Statistics Canada, the majority of RCMP 
officers provided provincial police services (6,702). This 
was closely followed by RCMP municipal policing 
(5,020) and federal policing  (4,509). Another 2,386 
officers were involved in RCMP Headquarters and the 
Training Academy. 
RCMP Officers by Level of Policing - Canada 2011 (numbers do not include 1,769 members at HQ & Training Academy)
Level / Region BC AB SK MN ON QC NB NS PEI NL YK NWT NU Total
Municipal 3,301 1,050 189 194 - - 215 62 9 - - - - 5,020
Provincial 1,804 1,342 786 615 - - 513 738 105 414 98 175 112 6,702
Federal 846 358 258 198 1,371 972 155 193 27 91 16 13 11 4,509
Other 165 67 45 34 108 49 36 46 11 32 8 9 7 617
Total 6,116 2,817 1,278 1,041 1,479 1,021 919 1,039 152 537 122 197 130 16,848
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The RCMP is Canada’s largest police 
organization. As of September 1, 
2011 the force’s on-strength 
establishment was 29,235. This 
includes 19,203 police officers, 
78  special constables, 3,760 
civilian members and 6,194 
public servants.
The RCMP is divided into 15 Divisions with 
Headquarters in Ottawa. Each division is managed 
by a commanding  officer and is designated 
alphabetically. 
RCMP DIVISIONS
Region Division Area
Pacific E British Columbia
M Yukon Territory
North West D Manitoba
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
V Nunavut Territory
K Alberta
Depot Regina, SK
Central A National Capital Region
O Ontario
C Quebec
Atlantic B Newfoundland
H Nova Scotia
J New Brunswick
L Prince Edward Island
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
CANADA’s TOP TEN STOLEN 
VEHICLES
On December 14, 2011 the Insurance Bureau of 
Canada released its annual list of the most 
frequently stolen vehicles in Canada. According  to 
the report there is an increasing  involvement of 
organized crime in auto theft as evidenced by the 
appearance of high-end models on the list. 
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada www.ibc.ca
TOP 10 STOLEN AUTOS
YR MAKE MODEL
1 2009 Toyota Venza 4-door
2 1999 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
3 2000 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
4 2006 Ford F350 Pickup Trick 4WD
5 2002 Cadillac Escalade EXT 4-door AWD
6 2006 Chevrolet TrailBlazer SS 4-door 4WD
7 2007 Ford F350 Pickup Trick 4WD
8 2001 Pontiac Aztek 4-door AWD
9 1998 Acura Integra 2-door
10 1999 Acura Integra 2-door
CORONER URGES SEATBELT USE
B.C.’s Coroners Service has recently completed a 
detailed study of 85 fatal motor vehicle crashes in 
the province’s Interior. The results showed that only 
47% of those who died were restrained at the time 
of crash. 
• 62% were drivers and 35% were passengers. In 
2% of cases, it could not be determined 
definitively who had been the driver in the crash.
• 62 % were male and 38 % were female although 
gender made little difference as to whether or 
not someone wore their seatbelt. 
• impaired drivers were significantly LESS likely to 
have been wearing  their seatbelt. In cases in 
which impairment was a factor, only 25% of 
those who died had been wearing their seatbelts. 
Source: http://www.newsroom.gov.bc.ca
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SEARCH FOR IP ADDRESS 
INFORMATION REASONABLE
R. v. Trapp, 2011 SKCA 143
 
An undercover police investigator 
monitoring  peer-to-peer file-sharing 
on the Internet searched for images or 
videos of child pornography. She 
browsed a computer’s shared folders 
and discovered that they contained child 
pornography files. She generated an Internet 
Protocol (IP) history for the corresponding  IP address 
and determined that the Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) was SaskTel, a Crown corporation. The 
investigator faxed a letter to SaskTel Security 
requesting  any information relating  to the IP  address 
under s. 29.2 of the Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA). SaskTel faxed the 
accused’s name and account information, which 
included his address, subscription services, 
telephone number, e-mail address, login name, cell 
phone number and television programming. Using 
this information, police were able to obtain the 
accused’s date of birth, driver’s licence number, 
registered vehicles, and a physical description 
through Saskatchewan’s driver licensing  and vehicle 
registration database. A warrant to search the 
accused’s residence was obtained and a computer 
was seized from a bedroom. An examination of the 
computer by a forensic computer analyst confirmed 
there was child pornography in a shared folder. He 
was charged with several child pornography 
offences. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial 
Court the accused sought the 
exclusion of the evidence obtained 
under the search warrant because 
his s. 8 Charter  rights, among 
others, had been breached when 
police obtained information about 
him from SaskTel. The judge 
concluded that the accused’s 
r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n o f 
informational privacy under s. 8 
was not infringed by police because 
they had acted in accordance with 
s. 29(2)(g) of FIPPA in the course of 
the investigation. The accused was convicted of 
several offences under the Criminal Code: making 
child pornography available - s. 163.1(3); accessing 
child pornography - s. 163.1(4.1); and two counts of 
possessing  child pornography - s. 163.1(4). He was 
sentenced to 13 months incarceration plus three 
years probation. He was also given a three-year s. 
161 order, a DNA order and a 20-year sex offender 
registry order. 
The accused appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal arguing  that the police required a warrant to 
obtain his account information from SaskTel relative 
to the IP address, which revealed intimate details of 
his lifestyle and personal choices. In his view, he 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy while 
surfing  the internet and police violated s. 8  of the 
Charter  by obtaining  his account information 
without a warrant. The Crown, on the other hand, 
submitted that the accused had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his account information in 
these circumstances. The Crown suggested that the 
subscr iber in format ion was not acquired 
biographical information and, in any event, the 
accused had no subjective or objective expectation 
of privacy. 
Was there a search?
 
Before determining  whether the accused enjoyed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the majority of 
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal outlined the 
framework for determining  whether s. 8  of the 
Charter was breached. Justice Cameron, authoring 
the majority judgment, stated:    
 
Section 8  of the Charter 
guarantees the r ight of 
everyone to be secure against 
unreasonable search or 
seizure. That being so, its 
principal purpose lies in 
protecting  persons from 
unreasonable state intrusion 
upon the i r p r ivacy o r, 
expressed posi t ively, to 
p r o t e c t t h e p e r s o n ’ s 
reasonable expectation of 
privacy in relation to the 
state. This makes it necessary, 
“[Section 8 of the Charter’s] 
principal purpose lies in 
protecting persons from 
unreasonable state intrusion 
upon their privacy or, 
expressed positively, to 
protect the person’s 
reasonable expectation of 
privacy in relation to the state.”  
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when the section is invoked, to assess the 
person’s interest in being left alone by the 
government against the government’s interest in 
intruding upon the privacy of the person for the 
purpose of law enforcement. [para. 5]
In assessing  whether a s. 8 breach occurred, courts 
will first need to determine whether the police 
conduct amounted to a “search”. The onus of 
establishing  that a search has occurred lies with an 
accused (the person invoking  the s. 8  protection). A 
“search” will occur if the conduct of the police 
intrudes upon the person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. This will require a subjective expectation of 
privacy that is objectively reasonable on the totality 
of the circumstances. Privacy interests include 
personal privacy (concerning  one’s body and bodily 
integrity), territorial privacy (the places one 
occupies, such as the home or the workplace), and 
informational privacy (the information about self 
that one may or may not wish to have disclosed). In 
cases featuring  allegedly confidential and private 
information about a person in the hands of a third 
party, the totality of the circumstances includes: the 
nature of the privacy interest asserted by the person; 
the precise nature of the subject matter of the 
alleged search; the relationship between the third 
party and the person; the legal framework governing 
disclosure of the information; the intrusiveness of the 
alleged search; and such other factors as may bear 
upon the strength or weakness of the expectation of 
privacy at issue. If there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy, there is no search. 
  
In this case, the majority concluded that the police 
conduct constituted a search. It found that the 
accused enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the information sought and obtained by the police 
from SaskTel regarding  the IP  Address it had assigned 
to him in relation to his access to the Internet. This 
information was then used for the purposes of 
furthering  their investigation and obtaining  a search 
warrant to search the accused’s home, seize his 
computer, and search it for evidence.  He had both a 
subjective expectation of privacy in that information, 
which was objectively reasonable having  regard for 
the totality of the circumstances. 
Was the search reasonable? 
If it is established that the conduct of the police 
amounted to a search, the second step of the inquiry 
asks whether the search was reasonable. A 
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable 
and the Crown bears the burden of establishing 
reasonableness. A search will be “reasonable” if it is 
authorized by law, the law is reasonable, and the 
search is carried out in reasonable manner.
In this case, the majority found the search was 
authorized by law - s. 487.014 of the Criminal Code. 
This provision permits a police officer, without a 
“production order”, to request a person to 
voluntarily provide information about another, 
provided the person of whom the request is made is 
not prohibited by law from disclosing  such 
information. Here, the police had reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that an offence had 
been committed and that SaskTel was in possession 
of information affording  evidence of it. Plus, the 
police had every reason to believe that SaskTel was 
not prohibited by law from disclosing  this 
information. As well, SaskTel voluntarily released the 
information on the request of the police. Since the 
accused never challenged the constitutionality of the 
section, the law itself was assumed to be reasonable. 
Further, the search was conducted in a reasonable 
manner. Since the search was reasonable there had 
been no Charter breach. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
BY THE BOOK:
Asking for Information: Criminal Code
s.487.014(1) Power of peace officer—
For greater certainty, no production 
order is necessary for a peace officer or 
public officer enforcing  or administering 
this or any other Act of Parliament to ask a 
person to voluntarily provide to the officer 
documents, data or information that the person 
is not prohibited by law from disclosing.
Volume 12 Issue 1 - January/February 2012
PAGE 24
A Different View
Justice Ottenbreit offered a different opinion. 
Although he assumed that there was a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the accused’s name, 
address, and phone number respecting  his IP 
address, the totality of the circumstances weighed 
against an objective expectation. In his view, there 
was no reasonable expectation of privacy and, 
therefore, no search had occurred. Since there was 
no search there was no s. 8  Charter breach. He too 
would have dismissed the accused’s appeal. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
NO PRIVACY INTEREST IN 
IP ADDRESS INFORMATION
R. v. Spencer, 2011 SKCA 144
By using  file-sharing  software, a 
police officer discovered fi les 
containing  child pornography in the 
shared folder of a computer and 
identified its Internet Protocol (IP) 
Address. He determined the IP  Address was assigned 
to Shaw Communications, a public corporation. He 
then sought the disclosure of customer the 
identifying  information relevant to the IP  Address 
under the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). In response, 
Shaw provided the name, address, telephone 
number, account number and current billing 
particulars relevant to the IP  Address, which turned 
out to be the accused’s sister. Using  this information, 
police prepared and obtained a warrant to search 
the residence located at the address provided by 
Shaw. The accused also resided at this address. 
When the search warrant was executed, the police 
discovered a significant quantity of child 
pornography in a shared folder on the accused’s 
computer. This material consisted of 441 distinct 
images and 112 videos. 
At his trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused argued that the letter from police to Shaw 
requesting  the IP  Address information amounted to 
an unreasonable search and seizure, violated s. 8  of 
the Charter, and the evidence should have been 
excluded. The judge found that the accused had no 
reasonable expectat ion of privacy in the 
circumstances. The accused was convicted of 
possessing  child pornography and making  child 
pornography available.  
Say one
Justice Caldwell concluded that the accused’s 
expectation of privacy in the IP information that was 
disclosed to police was not reasonable when viewed 
in the totality of the circumstances from the 
perspective of a reasonable and informed person 
concerned about the protection of privacy. In his 
view, the contractual terms of the agreement his 
sister had with Shaw, along  with the statutory terms 
of PIPEDA, negated an expectation of privacy. He 
stated:
It is clear from the terms of the Service 
Agreement that [the accused’s] sister had given 
her express, informed consent to Shaw to 
disclose the Disclosed Information to the police 
in the circumstances of this case. This fact moves 
the scales considerably more in favour of a 
finding that [the accused] did not hold an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the Disclosed Information.
 
However, even if [the accused’s] sister had not 
consented to the disclosure of her personal 
information, in these circumstances the 
disclosure would have been permitted under s. 
7(3)(c.1)(ii) of PIPEDA. Section 7(3) of PIPEDA 
supplements the basic rule prohibiting  disclosure 
in the absence of informed consent by setting 
forth certain disclosure activities which are 
permitted without the knowledge or consent of 
the individual in question. ... [paras. 38-39]
And further:
In summary, neither its contractual relationship 
with [the accused’s] sister, as set out in the 
Services Agreement, nor PIPEDA prohibited 
Shaw from disclosing  the Disclosed Information 
in the circumstances of this case; rather, each 
clearly provided Shaw with the discretion to 
disclose information to the police in these exact 
circumstances, and Shaw had [the accused’s] 
sister’s express, informed consent to do so. The 
sum of these factors militates very strongly 
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against a finding that [the accused’s] privacy 
expectation was reasonable. [para. 42]
Even if the accused did hold an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the disclosed 
information, Justice Caldwell would have found the 
search reasonable. The “search” was reasonably 
conducted and was authorized by a reasonable law. 
There was no s. 8 Charter violation. 
Say two
Justice Ottenbreit would also dismiss the accused’s 
appeal. He too opined there was no privacy interest 
in the information police had obtained from Shaw:
In my view, the Disclosed Information in this 
case merely establishes the identity of the 
contractual user of the IP address, who in this 
case was not the accused. The potential that the 
Disclosed Information might in this case 
eventually reveal much about the individual and 
the individual’s activity is, in my view, neither 
here nor there. In my respectful view, the fact 
that the Disclosed Information is of such a 
quality that it is capable of being used to assist 
in obtaining a search warrant which will lead to 
revealing to the police more intimate details 
about a person once the warrant is granted and 
executed, does not take it beyond what it is at 
this stage – simply name, address and telephone 
number. Theoretically, all the assertions in an 
information to obtain a search warrant have the 
potential of revealing to the police more 
intimate details of a person once the search 
warrant is granted and executed. In this respect 
the Disclosed Information has, in my view, no 
different special quality than any other piece of 
information that the police may receive prior to 
the warrant which furthers their investigation. 
[para. 110]
Say three
Justice Cameron doubted Justice Caldwell’s 
assessment that the contractual or statutory terms 
negated an expectation of privacy but nonetheless 
would have dismissed the accused’s appeal. Even if 
the accused enjoyed a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the information the police sought and 
obtained from Shaw, the search was reasonably 
conducted under the authority of s. 487.014(1) of 
the Criminal Code. 
The accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
Disclosure without knowledge or consent
s. 7(3)(c.1) PIPEDA
For the purpose of clause 4.3 of 
Schedule 1, and despite the note 
that accompanies that clause, an 
organizat ion may disclose 
personal information without the 
knowledge or consent of the 
individual only if the disclosure is organization;
... ... ...
(c.1) made to a government institution or part 
of a government institution that has made a 
request for the information, identified its lawful 
authority to obtain the information and 
indicated that 
(i) it suspects that the information relates to 
national security, the defence of Canada 
or the conduct of international affairs,
(ii) the disclosure is requested for the 
purpose of enforcing  any law of Canada, 
a province or a foreign jurisdiction, 
carrying  out an investigation relating  to 
the enforcement of any such law or 
gathering  intelligence for the purpose of 
enforcing any such law, or
(iii) the disclosure is requested for the 
purpose of administering  any law of 
Canada or a province.
www.10-8.ca
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CUFFED & CONFINED IN POLICE 
WAGON NOT NECESSARILY A 
DE FACTO ARREST
R. v. Chaif-Gust, 2011 BCCA 528
The police obtained a s. 11 
Controlled Drugs and Substances 
warrant to search for a marihuana 
grow operation at a residence 
believed to be uninhabited. The 
premises was rundown, it’s windows were all 
covered by drapes or sheets, there were no items in 
the yard and surveillance had revealed no activity 
in or around it.  Prior to entry, the police used a 
public address system to announce their presence 
and advise any occupants that the police had a 
search warrant and they were to “come to the front 
door now.” Within a minute, the accused was seen 
leaving  by the back door with another man. They 
were ordered to the ground, handcuffed and locked 
in the police wagon. The detaining  officer returned 
to his containment duties while others searched the 
house, finding  the premises almost entirely 
dedicated to a marijuana grow operation and the 
front door barricaded shut. Once the residence was 
cleared, the detaining  officer returned to the police 
wagon and arrested the accused for producing 
marihuana and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking, some 42 minutes after his initial 
detention. The officer obtained the accused’s name, 
birth date, and address, and advised him about the 
right to counsel. He indicated he wanted to speak 
to a lawyer and was searched incidental to his 
arrest; a key that opened the only door allowing 
access to the house was found in his pocket. He 
was transported to the police station, booked into 
jail, photographed and fingerprinted. However, he 
was not allowed to contact a lawyer until some 5 
1/2 hours after he was arrested.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
detaining  officer testified that he was instructed at 
the pre-search briefing  that anyone coming  out of 
the house would be taken into custody and then 
arrested once the police had confirmed the 
existence of an offence. The judge concluded that 
the accused’s detention was lawful. She stated:
i. The police had reasonable grounds to believe 
that a marihuana grow-op was inside the 
residence. This was established by the issuance 
of a search warrant to search the residence for 
this purpose.
ii.The presence of the accused inside this 
residence and his departure from the residence 
via the rear door of the residence in apparent 
defiance of the police direction that the 
occupants come to the front door gave rise to 
EVIDENCE
• the entire residence was dedicated to growing 
marihuana, except the kitchen, living room, and 
bedroom.  
• three level home.
• basement = four grow rooms. 
• main floor = two grow rooms. 
• attic = one “grow room” plus a large generator
• fluorescent lights, plastic reflective sheeting, and 
ducting.
• smell of marihuana overpowering and persuasive.
• estimated value of the crop discovered was between 
$276,000 and $696,000.
• front door barricaded from inside.
• ground floor basement door sealed shut. 
• only access in or out was the upper rear door leading to 
the main floor kitchen. 
• no beds or evidence anyone used house as a 
residence.
• no personal items were found in the house connected 
to the accused or his co-accused.
• accused’s fingerprints not located anywhere in the 
house.
• co-accused fingerprints found on pieces of equipment 
associated with the grow operation.
• accused was found in possession of a key to the only 
door allowing access to the house.
• residence was in a state of disrepair, worn and uncared 
for, and windows were all covered with drapes or 
sheets.
• lawns were brown and unattended.
• no items in the yards (patio furniture, garden furniture, 
or children’s toys) to suggest that anyone lived in the 
residence.
• during surveillance, no activity had ever been seen in or 
about the residence.  
• no activity seen at the residence the day prior to the 
warrant’s execution.
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a reasonable suspicion that the accused might 
have been implicated in the illegal grow-op 
inside the residence.   I note here that, at the 
time of the accused’s detention, neither [the 
lead investigator] nor [the detaining  officer] 
were aware of the fact that the front door was 
barricaded shut, such that the accused could 
only come out of the rear door.
She further found that the 
investigative detention was 
not a de facto arrest. Even 
though the nature and 
extent of the interference with the accused’s liberty 
were significant it was justified in the circumstances. 
The officer needed to safely control the men while 
he continued containment duties. Handcuffing  the 
men and locking  them in the police wagon was a 
necessary and reasonable step. The police never 
intended to arrest the men or attempted to 
interrogate or search them. Even the 42 minute delay 
did not convert the detention into a de facto arrest. 
As for the arrest, the police believed the residence 
was used solely to grow marihuana. The residence 
was worn and uncared for, the windows were 
covered with drapes or sheets, the lawns were 
brown and unattended, there was nothing  in the 
yard to suggest anyone lived there and no activity 
was seen during  surveillance. It was reasonable to 
believe that anyone at the residence was likely 
tending  to the grow. In the judge’s view, the accused 
was lawfully arrested after the grow operation was 
found. However, she found the police breached the 
accused’s rights under s. 10 because they did not 
inform him of the reason for his detention, did not 
advise him of his right to counsel, and did not 
permit him access to a lawyer. Although these 
breaches were serious and flagrant, the key that 
opened the access door and the photograph used to 
identify the accused in court were admitted under s. 
24(2). The accused was convicted of producing 
marihuana and possessing  it for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal arguing  his detention was arbitrary, 
amounted to a de facto arrest and breached his s. 9 
Charter rights. Furthermore, he suggested that his 
formal arrest was unlawful because police lacked 
reasonable grounds he was associated to the grow 
operation. Thus, the search incidental to arrest was 
unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter. As a result of 
the ss. 8, 9, and 10 breaches, he submitted that the 
key and photograph should have been excluded.        
Detention 
Chief Justice Finch first addressed the police power 
to detain for investigation. He stated:
[A] police officer has the authority to detain a 
person for investigative purposes provided that 
two conditions are met. First, the detention must 
be “viewed as reasonably necessary on an 
objec t ive v iew of the to ta l i ty o f the 
circumstances, informing the officer’s suspicion 
that there is a clear nexus between the 
individual to be detained and a recent or on-
going criminal offence.”  Second, the decision to 
d e t a i n m u s t p a s s a t e s t o f “ ove ra l l 
reasonableness” with respect to “all of the 
circumstances, most notably the extent to which 
the interference with individual liberty is 
necessary to perform the officer’s duty, the 
liberty interfered with, and the nature and extent 
of that interference.” [para. 34]
He then went on to conclude that not only did the 
trial judge use the correct legal test in determining 
the lawfulness of the accused’s detention, she also 
properly applied the test to the facts of the case. In 
his view, there was ample evidence for the trial 
judge to find that the requirements for a lawful 
detention were satisfied:
With respect to the initial lawfulness of the 
detention, the trial judge found that the police 
had an objectively reasonable suspicion that the 
[accused] might be implicated in a marijuana 
grow operation at the moment they detained 
him. They had a reasonable basis to believe that 
there was a grow operation inside the house, as 
a result of prior observations. These same 
observations had led the police to believe, on 
reasonable grounds, that the house was not used 
as a residence, enabling them to make the 
further inference that anyone present in the 
building  was there for the purpose of tending the 
grow operation. The fact that the [accused] and 
his co-accused left the house through the back 
door, when the police had ordered them out 
LATIN LEGAL LINGO
de facto = in reality
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through the front, provided additional grounds 
for reasonable suspicion that the two men were 
implicated in the production of marijuana — 
reasonable, because the police were not yet 
aware, and had no reason to suppose, that it was 
not possible to leave through the front door. 
[para. 39]
Justice Finch also ruled that 
the detention remained 
lawful and non-arbitrary for 
its entire duration. Here, the 
trial judge determined that 
the police experienced 
difficulty in searching  the 
interior of the house. There 
were many grow rooms in 
the house and the search 
was more time consuming 
than it may otherwise have 
been due to its cluttered 
condition. “The police had to satisfy themselves that 
there were no other persons in the building  so that it 
could be secured,” said Justice Finch. While the 
Court agreed that “the time required to search an 
entire residence will usually justify a longer 
detention of the building’s occupants than would a 
simple street check, the length of the detention 
cannot be disproportionate to the requirements of 
the investigation involved.” The Appeal Court 
rejected the accused’s contention that police 
understaffing  and insufficient resourcing  should not 
have been considered in determining  whether the 
detention was justified. Although a shortage of 
manpower or operational convenience cannot justify 
a disproportionate period of detention, “it will not 
always be possible to foresee the conditions to be 
encountered during  a search, nor to make an 
accurate estimate of the manpower necessary to 
complete it in a timely fashion.”
As for the detention being  a de facto arrest by the 
manner it was carried out - confined in a locked 
wagon while handcuffed - Justice Finch found there 
was no evidence that the police intended from the 
outset to arrest anyone who came to the door of the 
house they were searching. “The use of handcuffs or 
a police wagon do not, in and of themselves, render 
an otherwise reasonable detention a de facto arrest,” 
he said. 
The Arrest 
The police power to arrest without a warrant is 
found in s. 495(1) of the Criminal Code:  “A peace 
officer may arrest without warrant (a) a person who 
has committed an indictable offence or who, on 
reasonable grounds, he believes has committed or 
is about to commit an indictable offence.” 
Reasonable grounds requires both a subjective 
belief that must be justifiable from an objective 
point of view.  The police need not demonstrate 
anything more than reasonable grounds. 
Once the grow operation was located, the police 
established the existence of an indictable offence. 
However, the only link between the offence and 
the accused was his presence on the property. Was 
this enough to constitute subjective and objective 
reasonable grounds for arrest?  The Court said yes. 
The investigating  officer had concluded that the 
house was not being  used as a residence. Since its 
only apparent purpose was a grow operation, it was 
reasonable for the police to infer that anyone present 
at the house was there for the purpose of tending  the 
grow operation. The accused’s arrest and search was 
lawful. 
s. 10 Charter
The police did not respect the requirements of ss. 
10(a) and (b) of the Charter when the accused was 
detained and arrested.  He was not informed of the 
reason for his detention when he was first ordered to 
the ground and handcuffed, nor was he advised of 
his right to counsel at this time. Then, although he 
was told of the reason for his arrest and right to 
counsel when he was formally arrested, he was not 
permitted to contact counsel for a further 5 1/2 
hours.  Despite these breaches, the evidence of the 
key taken from the accused’s pocket as well as his 
photograph taken at booking  was admitted. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and his conviction 
upheld. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“The use of 
handcuffs or a 
police wagon do not, 
in and of themselves, 
render an otherwise 
reasonable 
detention a de facto 
arrest.”  
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ALL KNOWN INFORMATION 
CONSIDERED IN REASONABLE 
GROUNDS ASSESSMENT
R. v. Darby, 2012 ABCA 27
Police caught a car prowler in the 
process of breaking  into the accused’s 
Nissan Murano SUV. He was sitting 
in the vehicle and admitted to 
stealing  valuables. When looking  in 
the vehicle for documents with the owner’s current 
contact information, police located a set of keys 
draped over a loaded, unregistered handgun in the 
centre console. It’s serial number had been removed. 
When the vagrant was arrested, his backpack was 
searched. Police found a Blackberry in it, believed to 
be taken from the SUV. When the Blackberry was 
turned on to identify its owner, numerous text 
messages related to criminal activity, including 
weapons possession, drug  trafficking  and kidnapping 
were noted. The gang  unit was contacted and the 
accused became the target of a more intensive 
investigation, including  surveillance. Police saw the 
accused act suspiciously, including  making  meets 
with various individuals. They also learned he had 
rented two apartments. At one of these apartments, 
the manager made a lawful entry and found a stolen, 
sawed off shotgun inside. The apartment was 
otherwise empty and was seemingly uninhabited. 
Police believed this was a stash pad, used to store 
illicit drugs, cash, firearms and other contraband. 
Police formed the belief that the accused was a drug 
and firearm trafficker and obtained a general 
warrant, signed by a Provincial Court judge, to make 
covert entries into his apartments to look for 
evidence of illicit activities. The warrant itself did not 
describe the investigative technique or procedure it 
authorized, nor list the items to be searched for or 
conditions of any search or seizure. Instead, it 
referred to the attached ITO which spoke to these 
issues. The warrant further authorized entries if the 
police had “reasonable grounds to believe that any 
controlled drugs or substances or the proceeds of 
crime from the sale of controlled drugs or substances 
or firearms will be found at the location.” The police 
also executed a separate general warrant at an 
apartment the accused abandoned and found a 
secret access paneling  located in a bedroom closet 
likely used to store drugs and weapons. Police now 
believed he was using  his primary apartment to store 
his drugs and/or firearms. When the accused was 
arrested - about two months after the SUV break-in 
and a month after the warrant was issued - he was 
found in possession of $855, a Blackberry, and two 
additional cellphones. Police then searched his 
primary apartment and found eight kilograms of 
cocaine, $150,000 in cash, body armour and a 
handgun. He was charged with numerous drug  and 
weapons offences.
The accused challenged the validity of the warrant in 
the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. He argued, 
among  other grounds, that the evidence in the ITO 
was insufficient and that the grounds police relied 
upon to execute the warrant was inadequate. The 
trial judge concluded that the officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe the accused was involved in drug 
and weapons trafficking  when they obtained the 
general warrant as well as when they entered the 
apartment to search it. The accused’s Charter  rights 
had not been breached and, even if they were, the 
evidence was admissible under s. 24(2). The accused 
was convicted on most of the charges.  
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Possession v. Production
“Knowledge and control are the 
key elements in any form of 
possession. T he of fence of 
production is not an included 
offence necessarily encompassed 
by proof of possession. Production requires active 
participation in the growing of the marijuana. 
However, an individual may be guilty of production 
either as a principal or a party who aids or abets.”– 
British Columbia Court of Appeal Chief Justice Finch in 
R. v. Chaif-Gust, 2011 BCCA 528 at para. 75..  
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The accused then contended before the Alberta 
Court of Appeal that the police lacked reasonable 
grounds to execute the warrant when they searched 
his residence. In his view, the ITO did not provide 
reasonable grounds that drugs would be found in his 
apartment a month after it was prepared. 
Furthermore, he suggested that the police 
surveillance failed to provide anything  more than a 
suspicion that he was involved in drug  trafficking. 
Thus, he contended, when the police entered his 
apartment they lacked reasonable grounds to believe 
they would find drugs and just got lucky. 
The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. In 
assessing  whether the police had the requisite 
reasonable grounds when they searched the 
accused’s apartment, all of the information known to 
the investigators at that time must be considered. 
This not only includes the information contained in 
the ITO but also the “amplification” information 
procured during  the voire dire and the evidence 
derived from police surveillance, which “solidified 
and reinforced their view, or, in other words, their 
‘... reasonable grounds to believe ... .’” The Court 
noted:
• After the accused gave up possession to his 
second apartment, the police executed a 
separately issued general warrant on that 
property and found a secret “access paneling” 
located in the bedroom closet, which was likely 
used to store drugs or weapons. That led police 
to believe that after abandoning  that apartment 
the accused was using  his primary apartment to 
store his drugs and/or firearms.
• The accused was observed to be using  a rental 
car, even though he had two other vehicles at 
his disposal. He also transferred his Jeep’s 
registration to another vehicle, although he 
continued to use the Jeep. These practices were 
consistent with established drug  trafficking 
practices as testified to by the police.
• When he was arrested prior to the execution of 
the warrant on his apartment, the appellant had 
in his possession $855 in cash, a Blackberry 
and two additional cell phones.
In sum, the Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge 
did not err in finding  that the police had the 
requisite reasonable belief when they executed the 
general warrant and searched the accused’s 
apartment. 
Furthermore, the fact that the general warrant did 
not list the authorized device, investigative 
technique or procedure, nor set out the terms and 
conditions, render it a nullity. The warrant referred to 
the “attached ITO” which addressed those issues. 
Although this may not have been a good practice, it 
did not impact the accused’s privacy interests. 
Incorporating  portions of the ITO by reference did 
not detract from the underlying  objectives and 
interests that the authorizing  provisions were 
designed to protect. The warrant was immediately 
sealed to preserve the ongoing  investigation and the 
accused was aware when arrested that his place was 
searched based on the warrant. He also ultimately 
received disclosure of all relevant information. 
Furthermore, incorporating  the ITO by reference did 
not mislead the authorizing  judge or the reviewing 
court and the investigating  officers were well 
acquainted with the terms of the warrant. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
LINE BETWEEN INVESTIGATION 
& OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT 
CRIME IS FINE
R. v. Bayat, 2011 ONCA 778
After being  contacted by the vice-
principal of a high school, a cyber 
crime unit detective entered into an 
investigation involving  a 16-year-old 
female student who had entered into 
a sexual relationship with a 22-year-old male she 
had met on the Internet. After several interviews with 
the complainant and her friends, who were 
unwilling  to assist in the prosecution, police learned 
that the accused had consensual sex and videotaped 
the acts, showing  the video to at least one of the 
complainant’s friends. The detective obtained the 
accused’s hotmail address for MSN messenger and, 
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posing  as a 13 year old girl named “Natasha,” sent a 
message asking  to be added as a “friend”. The next 
day the detective was accepted as a friend and the 
accused initiated an exchange with “Natasha.” He 
asked her who she was, how she got his address and 
to let him see her via webcam.  “Natasha” replied 
that her mom would not let her have a webcam, but 
a picture of herself swimming  in a pool was sent. 
The picture was actually a colour photograph of a 
female police member taken when the officer was 
about 13-years-old. Once the picture was received, 
an exchange occurred and later the accused 
arranged to meet with “Natasha.” He was arrested 
by police at a pay-phone near the proposed meeting 
spot.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
detective testified that he commenced the 
investigation because he believed the accused was 
possibly producing  and distr ibuting  child 
pornography. Child pornography is defined in s. 
163.1(1) of the Criminal Code as including  images of 
persons under the age of 18 years. Since the sexual 
activity was consensual and the complainant was 
16-years-old, no sexual offence had been 
committed. The accused was found guilty of child 
luring  under s. 172.1, but the charge was judicially 
stayed on the basis of entrapment. The judge found 
that police entrapped the accused because the 
police did not have a reasonable suspicion he was 
involved in a particular crime when they first 
communicated with him nor were they involved in a 
bona fide enquiry:
• absence of a reasonable suspicion. The judge 
opined that the detective, posing  as “Natasha,” 
required a reasonable suspicion at the time he 
made first contact with the accused. Since the 
detective did not have a subjective belief that 
the accused was engaged in child luring, the 
requisite reasonable suspicion was not met. 
• absence of a bona fide inquiry. The judge 
disbelieved the detective and made an adverse 
finding  of credibility against him on whether he 
was engaged in a bona fide investigation. In the 
judge’s view, the officer’s claim that he was 
engaged in a child pornography investigation 
was incons is tent wi th h is method of 
investigation.
The Crown challenged the judicial stay of 
proceedings to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
Entrapment
On the reasonable suspicion branch of entrapment, 
the police must not offer a person the opportunity to 
commit a crime unless they have a reasonable 
suspicion that the person is already engaged in 
criminal activity. In such a case, a court must make 
two findings: 
(1) the police provided an opportunity to commit an 
offence; and 
(2) the police did so without a reasonable suspicion.  
In the Crown’s view, police never provided the 
accused with an opportunity to commit an offence 
and, if they did, such opportunity was not given until 
well into the communication at a time when the 
officer had a reasonable suspicion that the accused 
was engaged in child luring  by reason of his own 
messages to “Natasha”.
Justice Rosenberg, delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, agreed with the Crown. Noting  that “the 
line between proper investigation and providing  an 
opportunity to commit an offence can be a fine 
one.” He said:
The issue is a difficult one and the line between 
simple investigation and offering  an opportunity 
to commit an offence will sometimes be difficult 
to draw. In my view, the trial judge erred in 
failing  to consider whether the officer’s conduct 
in simply opening up a dialogue with the 
[accused] constituted an opportunity to commit 
an offence. ... [T]he trial judge held that the 
reasonable suspicion had to exist from the 
moment the officer contacted the [accused]. He 
failed to consider whether that initial contact 
was an offer of an opportunity to commit an 
offence. In my view, it was not. The initial 
contact was no more than a step in an 
investigation, the equivalent of a knock on a 
door.
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[The detective], in the guise of Natasha, offered 
to be added as a “friend” to the [accused’s] MSN 
account. This act could not be construed as an 
opportunity to commit the offence of child 
luring. After the initial contact was made, the 
[accused] took the initiative in opening up 
communications with Natasha. The [accused] 
asked to view Natasha. The photograph provided 
by the officer in response to this request was 
neutral. It could in not be construed as sexually 
provocative or as offering an opportunity to 
commit an offence. The [accused] took the lead 
in engaging  in ever more explicit sexual 
discussions even though by then he believed 
that Natasha was a child. The officer gave the 
[accused] several opportunities to withdraw from 
the discussion. However, the respondent chose 
to carry on.
Counsel for the [accused] argues that the 
officer’s conduct in targeting the respondent 
through his MSN account was materially 
different from the usual method used by the 
police of entering a chat room.  While I 
appreciate that there is a difference, in my view, 
it is not a legally material distinction. In the chat 
room type of investigation, police officers 
initially make themselves available to chat with 
everyone in the chat room, and then may enter a 
dialogue with particular individual. In this case 
the police officer made himself available to chat 
with a particular individual from the outset. In 
both situations, if it is the accused who takes the 
lead in directing  the conversation, the element 
of offering an opportunity to commit the offence 
of child luring is not made out. There is a 
difference between simply providing an 
opportunity to chat or talk, and providing an 
opportunity to commit the offence of child 
luring. [reference omitted, paras. 19-21]
The police did not cross the line between proper 
investigation and providing  an opportunity to 
commit an offence. Since no opportunity to commit 
an offence was provided, entrapment was not made 
out. The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the stay of 
proceedings was set aside and the case was sent 
back to the trial judge for sentencing. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
THE INTERNET EXCHANGE
natasha: did u see my pic
accused:  ya
natasha: wat u think
accused:  ur cute but too young
natasha: im 13 now but i was 12 in the pic
accused: oh ok but still young lol
natasha: for wat lol
accused: to talk to me
natasha: oh how old r u
accused: 22
natasha: oh thats kewl but if y don wanna whatever
accused: i dont care
natasha: k its kewl wit me
.........
accused: do u like to hav fun
natasha: ya of corse lol
accused: wat kinda fun
natasha: anything i guess is kewl
accused: how about with a guy:P
natasha: wat u mean
accused: u know getting naughty n having fun with a guy
natasha: oh lol sure thats kewl
accused: lol ok u do that alot
natasha: ya a few time
accused: wat have u done
natasha: everything
accused: like
natasha: naughty stuff lol what u done
accused: ru a virgin
natasha: i did it once
accused: with who
natasha: my ex bf
accused: how was it
natasha: it hurt a bit but it was fun
accused: ya i know
natasha: what have u done
accused: so wat hav u done other then that
natasha: u first lol
accused: i've done everything
natasha: k wat u don
accused: everything in sex lol
natasha: kewl lol what u like most
accused: tight girls n sexy n cute ones like u
natasha: relly u like me?
accused: like to get to know u
natasha: kewl me to
accused: thats good
natasha: yuppers
accused: hav u give a head
natasha: no i never done that have u had that done to u
accused: ya
natasha: lol was it fun
accused: yes very
natasha: lol guys like that
accused: lol ya will u do it to me:P
natasha: ummmm k but i dont know wat u look like lol
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TELEPHONE RECORDS ORDER 
MAY BE OBTAINED WITHOUT 
RECORDER WARRANT 
R. v. Mahmood, 2011 ONCA 693
Police were investigating  the violent 
robbery of a jewelry store. When the 
store owner opened for business, two 
people, one wearing  a burka, entered 
the store and produced handguns. 
The owner was forced at gunpoint into an office and 
bound, while a third person was admitted into the 
store. Surveillance camera’s were removed and the 
robbers left with $500,000 in jewelry and $35,000 
in cash. A plastic bag  marked “Amira Islamic 
Fashions” was found on the store floor and police 
learned that three men had purchased a burka about 
three weeks before the robbery. As a result of their 
enquiries one of the accused was identified as 
involved in the purchase of the burka. Police 
obtained a “tower dump warrant” under s. 487 of 
the Criminal Code to search cellular telephone 
companies for account information  including  name, 
home and business address, date of birth, date and 
time of call and all telephone numbers dialed or 
received. This warrant targeted all customers 
accessing  cell towers located near the jewelry store 
between 10:20 am and 11:50 am on the day of the 
robbery. The police thought that cell phone traffic 
near the store, around the time of the robbery, might 
help them track down the robbers. When the 
warrant was executed, information about 7,000 cell 
phone customers involved in more than 9,000 calls 
was obtained. As a result of this information, police 
were able to identify potential suspects and establish 
surveillance. Then they got another conventional 
search warrant for the cell phone records of a few 
people they thought could be involved in the 
robbery. Police continued physical surveillance and 
background checks of their suspects and 
subsequently obtained more conventional search 
warrants for the homes of the suspects. The ITO for 
these warrants included the contents of the ITOs 
from the tower dump and subscriber warrants. Police 
were able to recover currency, gold and jewelry 
stolen during the robbery. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accuseds challenged the grounds upon which the 
search warrants were issued. In their view, the tower 
dump warrant lacked the necessary reasonable 
grounds for belief and therefore their s. 8  Charter 
rights were breached. If the information from the 
tower dump warrants was excised from the ITOs for 
the subscriber and residential warrants, they too 
could not be sustained. As a result, the accuseds’ 
sought the exclusion of all of the evidence obtained 
from the warrants under s. 24(2). The trial judge 
concluded that cellphone subscribers have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in records 
maintained by their cell phone providers and were 
therefore protected under s. 8. He found the ITO for 
the tower dumps failed to disclose the reasonable 
grounds required by s. 487. The seizure was 
unreasonable and the records were excluded. After 
excluding  the tower dump information from the 
subscriber warrants, the judge also found the 
subscriber warrants could not be sustained. 
However, the trial judge opined that even after 
excising  all of the cellular telephone data gathered 
under the tower dump warrant, the information 
gathered by traditional police methods could have 
supported a telephone records warrant under s. 
492.2(2) of the Criminal Code on the basis of the less 
onerous standard of a reasonable suspicion. The 
subscriber records were admitted under s. 24(2). 
Finally, the judge held that the residential warrants 
could not have been issued if the tower dump 
information was excised, but the evidence seized 
from the homes was also admitted under s. 24(2). 
The accuseds Mahmood, Fundi and Sheikh were 
convicted by a jury of several offences arising  out of 
the robbery. A fourth accused had already pled 
guilty and appeared as a witness for the Crown.
The accuseds then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, among  other grounds, that the 
evidence of their cell phone records and the things 
found in the search of their homes should have been 
excluded. In their view, the trial judge was wrong  in 
concluding  that police could have obtained the 
subscriber records under s. 492.2(2) and that this 
alternative constitutional means lessened the 
seriousness of the s. 8 breach. 
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s. 492.2(2) Telephone Records Orders
The accuseds submitted, in part, that orders issued 
under s. 492.2(2) supplement number recorder 
warrants issued under s. 492.2(1) and could only be 
issued in conjunction with a number recorder 
warrant. Since there was no number recorder 
warrant under s. 492.2(1) in this case, no telephone 
records order under s. 492.2(2) was available. 
Further, they suggested that a telephone records 
order could only authorize the seizure of records 
existing  contemporaneously with the operation of 
the number recorder and did not permit the seizure 
of records for calls made prior to the issuance of the 
number recorder warrant. The Crown, on the other 
hand, submitted that a telephone records order, 
issued on the less stringent standard of reasonable 
suspicion, was not dependent on the issuance of a 
number recorder warrant under s. 492.2(1). In its 
view, a telephone records order could be issued 
together with, or independently of, number recorder 
warrants and could include information about both 
prior or future telephone use. 
Justice Watt, authoring  the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, summarized the telephone records order 
provisions as follows:
In general terms, s. 492.2(1) authorizes a justice 
to issue a number recorder warrant provided the 
justice is satisfied by an information on oath and 
in writing  that there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect that an offence against a federal statute 
has been or will be committed, and that 
information that would assist in the investigation 
of that offence could be obtained through the 
use of a number recorder, as defined in s. 
492.2(4).  The warrant looks forward for a period 
not exceeding 60 days and gathers information 
about telephone numbers and locations from 
“Cell phone use is ubiquitous. Users and their phones become one, inseparable. Users talk 
to other users. Any time. Anywhere. Conversations - some brief, others lengthy - end. But 
something of them remains. Cell phone companies keep records. Of calls made and received. 
Of time and length. Of subscribers whose phone was used to make or receive a call. And 
those records, essential for billing purposes, can help to find out where the caller made or 
the recipient got the call. Sometimes, records kept by cell phone companies help police 
investigate crimes.”  [paras. 1-3]  
BY THE BOOK:
Telephone Records Order: Criminal Code
Information re number recorder
s.492.2(1) A justice who is satisfied 
by information on oath and in 
writing  that there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that an offence 
under this or any other Act of 
Parliament has been or will be 
committed  and that information 
t h a t w o u l d a s s i s t i n t h e 
investigation of the offence could be obtained  through the 
use of a number recorder, may at any time issue a warrant 
authorizing  a peace officer or a public officer who has been 
appointed or designated  to administer or enforce a  federal 
or provincial law and whose duties include the enforcement 
of this Act or any other Act of Parliament and who is named 
in the warrant.
(a) to install, maintain and remove a number recorder in 
relation to any telephone or telephone line; and
(b) to monitor, or to have monitored, the number recorder.
Order re telephone records
(2)  When the circumstances referred  to in subsection (1) 
exist,  a justice may order that  any person or body that 
lawfully possesses records of telephone calls originated 
from, or received  or intended to be received at, any 
telephone give the records, or a copy of the records, to a 
person named in the order.
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which calls are made, at which they are received 
or to which they are intended.
An order under s. 492.2(2) may only be made 
“when the circumstances referred to in 
subsection (1) exist.”   An order under s. 492.2(2) 
requires production, to a person named in the 
order, of records of telephone calls originated 
from, or received, or intended for reception, at 
any telephone. The use of the present tense 
“possesses” in subsection (2) appears to refer to 
records extant at the time the order is made, thus 
including records that catalogue previous calls.
... ... ...
A number recorder is a device that can be used 
to record or identify a telephone number or the 
location of a telephone from which a call 
originates or at which the call is received or is 
intended to be received: Criminal Code, s. 
492.2(4). The recorder is activated when the 
subscriber’s telephone is taken “off the hook”. 
Electronic impulses from the monitored 
telephone are recorded on a computer printout 
tape that discloses the number called when an 
outgoing  call is placed. The number recorder 
does not record whether the receiving  telephone 
was answered by a person, or the substance of 
any conversation. For incoming calls, the 
number recorder records only the number 
calling and how long the monitored telephone 
was “off the hook” when answered. [references 
omitted, paras. 103, 104, 107]
The Appeal Court then went on to interpret the 
meaning  of s. 492.2(2). It found a telephone records 
order not only included circumstances in which a 
number recorder warrant was issued under s. 
492.2(1), but also permitted “a production order for 
existing  records of previous calls, provided the 
justice was satisfied that there were reasonable 
grounds to suspect an offence under a federal statute 
had been or would be committed, and that 
information that would assist in the investigation of 
that offence could be obtained through an 
examination of the records.” In Justice Watt’s view, 
“historical information contained in the records may 
well assist investigators, for example, to obtain a 
number recorder warrant, a general warrant for 
video surveillance or an authorization to intercept 
private communications.” Plus the standard for 
issuing  an order under s. 492.2 is lower than what is 
Reasonable Expectation in 
Informational Privacy: A Refresher
In Mahmood, the Ontario Court of Appeal provided a 
review of s.8 of the Charter and informational privacy:
The s. 8 Charter guarantee of security from unreasonable 
search or seizure protects only a reasonable expectation.  To 
determine whether an  investigative procedure invades a 
reasonable expectation of privacy requires consideration of all 
the circumstances, especially whether a subjective expectation 
of privacy exists and whether, if it does, the expectation is 
objectively reasonable in the circumstances. 
The privacy interests protected by s. 8  include personal privacy, 
territorial privacy and informational privacy...
Informational privacy has to do with how much information 
about ourselves and our activities we are entitled to shield  from 
the curious eyes and ears of the state: Informational privacy is 
the claim of individuals, groups or  institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others.
Section 8 protects the biographical core of personal 
information  that individuals, in  a free and  democratic society, 
would  wish  to maintain and  control from dissemination  to the 
state. This biographical core includes, but is not confined to 
information  that tends to reveal intimate details about an 
individual’s lifestyle and personal choices.
Section 8 does not protect all information that an  individual 
may wish  to keep  confidential. On the other  hand, merely 
because the information for which protection  is sought is 
commercial in its nature does not exclude it from the 
protection of s. 8.
 Where concerns about informational privacy emerge, the 
quality of the information  said to be protected by the guarantee 
in  s. 8  is important:. Relevant factors that inform whether 
information  will fall within  or  beyond  the interest protected by 
s. 8 ... include, but are not limited to:
i. the nature of the information itself;
ii. the nature of the relationship  between the party releasing 
or  holding the information and the party asserting 
confidentiality;
iii. the place where the information was obtained; and
iv. the manner in which the information is obtained.
It is worth remembering that all reasonable expectations of 
privacy are not equal. Some are of a greater magnitude than 
others. The degree of personal privacy reasonably expected at 
customs on entry to Canada, for example, is lower  than in most 
other situations. Likewise, a comparatively low expectation of 
privacy attaches to premises or documents used  or produced in 
the course of activities which, though  lawful, are state regulated, 
and thus routinely inspected by state officials. Business records 
raise much weaker privacy concerns than personal papers.
The minimal nature of the intrusion by which information  is 
obtained  may also be of importance in assessing whether  a 
reasonable expectation of privacy has been established, 
especially where the activity monitored  is itself subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. [references omitted, paras. 
90-97]
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required for a s. 487 warrant:
The standard “reasonable grounds to suspect” in 
s. 492.2(1) is less exacting than “reasonable 
grounds to believe” that is required for a 
conventional search warrant. The standard is 
objective in nature and has been adopted by 
Parliament for searches in areas that involve 
lesser expectations of privacy.
In the search context, a “suspicion” has been 
characterized as an expectation that the targeted 
individual is possibly engaged in some criminal 
activity. A “reasonable suspicion” means 
something more than a mere suspicion and 
something less than a belief based on reasonable 
and probable grounds. A sincerely held 
subjective belief is not a reasonable suspicion. 
To be reasonable, a suspicion must be supported 
by factual elements about which evidence can 
be adduced and permit an independent judicial 
evaluation. [references omitted, paras. 113-114]
This ground of appeal was dismissed and the 
admission of the evidence was upheld. The 
accuseds’ convictions were affirmed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quotes
"I do not like this word bomb. It is not a bomb it 
is a device which  is exploding." - Jacques Le Blanc, 
French Ambassador.
"The streets are safe in Philadelphia, it's only the 
people who make them unsafe." - Frank L. Rizzo, 
ex-police chief and mayor.
CIVILIAN WITNESSES PROVIDE 
EVIDENCE OF IMPAIRMENT
R. v. Walton, 2011 BCCA 535
At trial in British Columbia Provincial 
Court two civilian witnesses in a 
common law relationship, Ms. 
Mitchell and Mr. Tingey, provided 
evidence relevant to an impaired 
driving  investigation. Both knew the accused as the 
neighbour of the friend they were visiting  that 
evening with their baby.
Ms. Mitchell had talked to the accused outside their 
friends’ home. She testified he was slurring  his 
speech and staggering, and tried to put his arm 
around her. She said he was “definitely intoxicated”. 
On cross-examination she said she did not know if 
his mouth was dry, which may have affected the way 
he was speaking. As Ms.  Mitchell was putting  her 
baby in the back seat of her parked car, the accused 
reversed his truck toward her vehicle. She yelled at 
him to stop about five times but he drove into it. 
She went to the driver’s side of his vehicle and yelled 
at him through the window. He did not open it nor 
apologize, and just drove away. Ms.  Mitchell said 
she had worked at a McDonald’s Restaurant on and 
off for about seven years and had dealings there 
“quite often” with at least a handful of people who 
were impaired by alcohol. She said she determined 
whether customers were impaired by their speech, 
the way they talked, whether they are staggering  and 
“the obvious”.
Mr. Tingey testified that the accused drove up to his 
friends’ home in his truck and was “clearly 
intoxicated”. He needed help getting  out of the truck 
and could not walk straight. Mr.  Tingey said about 
an hour later the accused left his residence and 
drove away. Later he returned and backed into their 
car while he was trying  to park. On cross-
examination, Mr.  Tingey agreed the accused could 
have had trouble getting  out of his truck because the 
truck had a problem with the door lock. Mr. Tingey 
said that his parents were alcoholics and, as a result, 
he had often dealt with people who were impaired. 
In his experience, people impaired by alcohol 
stagger, slur and are unable to communicate. He 
“A “reasonable suspicion” means something 
more than a mere suspicion and something 
less than a belief based on reasonable and 
probable grounds. A sincerely held 
subjective belief is not a reasonable 
suspicion. To be reasonable, a suspicion 
must be supported by factual elements 
about which evidence can be adduced and 
permit an independent judicial evaluation.”
...
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described them as “not normal” and said they may 
be aggressive. 
After the collision, the police were called but had no 
dealings with the accused. Although the trial only 
lasted an hour, the provincial court judge convicted 
the accused of having  care or control of a vehicle 
while impaired. He ruled that the evidence was 
overwhelming  and the indicia of impairment, as 
related by the witnesses, was persuasive beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Both civilian witnesses had 
considerable experience with those who were 
impaired by alcohol.
Before the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the 
accused challenged his conviction. In his opinion, 
the conviction was based on mere suspicion of 
impairment by alcohol. The difficulty he had getting 
out of his truck, walking  and talking  could have 
been caused by medical conditions or something 
other than impairment by alcohol or a drug. Further, 
he said there was no evidence the witnesses saw 
him drinking  alcohol, smelled it on his breath or 
heard him say anything  that indicated he had been 
drinking. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, however, was 
unable to agree with the accused. “It is fair to say 
that the indicia of impairment by alcohol generally 
include evidence that points to consumption of 
alcohol – seeing  the accused drinking, an admission 
that he was drinking, or an odour of alcohol 
emanating  from his breath or body,” said Justice 
Neilson for the Court. “Nevertheless, there is no 
particular test or checklist of factors for determining 
impairment for the purposes of s.  253(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code, nor is there any definitive behaviour 
or factor required to establish that condition. 
Typically, the fact-finder will consider evidence of 
the driving  pattern, the physical appearance of the 
accused, his or her conduct, particularly the ability 
to walk and communicate, and evidence suggesting 
ingestion of alcohol. This evidence must be 
examined as a whole, with a view to determining 
whether the conduct of the accused shows a marked 
departure from the norm. The evidence of signs and 
symptoms suggesting  impairment by alcohol may be 
given by lay witnesses, who may also provide their 
opinion as to the driver’s possible impairment based 
on those observations.” 
Here, the two civilian witnesses each had 
experience in dealing  with people who were 
impaired by alcohol; one because of family reasons 
and the other due to employment contacts. 
Furthermore, it was also important that both knew 
the accused prior to the events underlying  the 
charge. They had a benchmark by which to measure 
his conduct on the evening  in question. The 
accused’s assertions that there were other possible 
explanations for his behaviour was speculative; there 
was no evidentiary basis for them.  The only cause of 
the accused’s impairment put forward by Crown was 
his consumption of alcohol. The two civilian 
witnesses referred to the accused as “intoxicated”, a 
term universally used to describe impairment by 
alcohol. And there was no evidence to substantiate 
the other explanations put forward by the accused 
on cross-examination. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“[T]here is no particular test or checklist of factors for determining impairment for the 
purposes of s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, nor is there any definitive behaviour or factor 
required to establish that condition. Typically, the fact-finder will consider evidence of the 
driving pattern, the physical appearance of the accused, his or her conduct, particularly the 
ability to walk and communicate, and evidence suggesting ingestion of alcohol. ... The 
evidence of signs and symptoms suggesting impairment by alcohol may be given by lay 
witnesses, who may also provide their opinion as to the driver’s possible impairment based on 
those observations.”
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BULLET POINTS
Fingerprints
Fingerprints found on the window where the burglar 
gained entry could, in the circumstances of this case, 
justify the inference that the accused was the burglar. 
The location on the window where the print was 
found, the direction of the handprint on the window, 
evidence from the print indicating the hand was 
moving along the window and the fact that the window 
opened by sliding horizontally in the direction the 
hand was pointing supported the inference that the 
accused was in the act of opening  the window, not just 
touching  it. A reasonable trier of fact could be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the 
burglar who gained entry through the window. R. v. 
Menard, 2012 ONCA 29. 
Identification: Recognition Evidence
“While recognition evidence may be more reliable 
than eyewitness identification of a stranger, special 
caution must still be taken when using  it to identify an 
offender, as it is still merely a statement of a witness’s 
opinion about what he or she saw. Like all 
identification evidence its weight or reliability will 
depend on such circumstances as the nature, length 
and memorable features of the witness’s previous 
contact with the accused.” R. v. Pierce, 2011 BCCA 
485. 
“In Association With” Criminal Organization
The accused’s conviction for trafficking  in cocaine in 
association with a criminal organization was upheld.  
Although he argued that the transaction in question 
was a one-time occurrence and had nothing to do with 
his and the other participant’s membership in the Hells 
Angels, the trial judge properly concluded that the 
transaction was “in association with” the Hells Angels; 
(1) the accused and the police agent were both full 
patch members of the Hells Angels; (2) they met on a 
social cruise function held by the Hells Angels; (3) the 
police agent obtained the accused’s pager number 
through the Toronto Clubhouse; and (4) the wiretaps 
indicated that there were to be further transactions. R. 
v. Bodenstein, 2011 ONCA 737.
Tipping Off Informant
There is no bright line rule that prohibits a Crown 
prosecutor from disclosing  to a police officer the 
arguments defence counsel will make in support of 
their challenge to a search warrant. In this case, 
defence counsel had filed a factum outlining  the legal 
arguments he intended to advance and the subjects to 
be explored in the cross-examination of a police officer 
who prepared and swore the ITOs for search warrants. 
The defence lawyer had asked the prosecutor not to 
provide the police officer with a copy of the factum nor 
discuss the areas he would be cross-examined on. The 
prosecutor, however, met with the officer and 
mentioned some of the general areas or subjects upon 
which the officer would be cross-examined. Although 
their is no bright line rule; “each case depends and 
must be decided on its own facts. What would be 
improper in one case may be entirely appropriate in 
another.” R. v. Mahmood, 2011 ONCA 693.
Standard of Review for a Search Warrant
“A reviewing judge does not substitute his or her view 
for that of the justice who issued the warrant. Rather, 
the reviewing judge considers the record before the 
issuing justice, the ITO, trimmed of any extraneous or 
unconstitutionally obtained information, but amplified 
by evidence adduced on the hearing to correct minor 
technical errors in drafting the ITO, to determine 
whether there remains sufficient credible and reliable 
evidence to permit the justice to issue the warrant”. R. 
v. Mahmood, 2011 ONCA 693. 
Drug Possession for Trafficking
The accused’s conviction of possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking  was upheld. He was the driver 
and sole occupant of the car. A clear plastic bag 
containing  a one gram rock of cocaine and five flaps of 
heroin weighing 0.1 grams each was in close proximity 
to, and likely in plain view of, the driver. It was 
between the driver’s seat and console. “In the absence 
of any evidence of how the drugs may have come to be 
present in the car without the [accused’s] knowledge, 
or any denial of control or knowledge, it was open to 
the judge on the facts to conclude that the only 
reasonable inference to draw was that the [accused] 
had possession of the drugs,” said the Court of Appeal. 
It was also open to the trial judge to conclude 
possession for the purpose o trafficking even though 
there was only a small amount of drugs found. There 
was an absence of drug paraphernalia for personal use. 
This, in combination fo other factors - a rental car, 
multiple cell phones, small denominations of money, 
location and packaging  of drugs - together were indicia 
of drug  trafficking. R. v. Mulligan-Brum, 2011 BCCA 
410
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APPLY NOW – Applications are now being 
accepted for the May 2012 Cohort.
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